Challenges in South China Sea, sophisticated diplomacy needed

Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

Sophisticated diplomacy needed to tackle challenges in South China Sea

Philippine President Benigno Aquino III will seek the congressional approval of the proposed national budget for 2016 next week. In the budget proposal, the defense budget is $552 million, less than one 200th of China's military spending for 2015. The size of the Philippine defense budget may surprise many Chinese.

The defense spending of Vietnam is much higher than that of the Philippines. It reached $4 billion in 2014, but is still incomparable to China's. The GDP of Vietnam is less than $200 billion, much less than that of China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region which borders Vietnam. This will definitely constrain its overall scale of defense budget.

Though judging from the military spending of the Philippines and Vietnam, we can perhaps understand that the two countries won't pose a serious military threat to China in the South China Sea. But they are very likely to make a fuss and lean to external actors to intrude China's sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea.

The Philippines, facing a China with expanding maritime strength, feels anxious. But it is still greedy in its territorial claims. It holds a complex and sensitive mentality toward China.

Propaganda that China bullies small South China Sea claimants can spread easily, especially when Washington and Tokyo meddle backstage. China needs to do a lot of work to convince people of historical facts such as the origin of the nine-dashed line and that China holds sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. However, it is much easier to frame China as attempting to exert "hegemony" in the South China Sea.

China has to deal with the Philippines and Vietnam with enough patience and at the same time respond to distorted interpretations from the US and Japan about China's reef-building. The troubles are mostly caused by Manila and Hanoi, while strategic pressure mainly comes from the US.

The US and Japan have teamed up with the Philippines. China is not only facing several vessels and coast guard ships of the Philippines. Rather, China has been striving to figure out how to deal with the above issues and its own stakes in such a complicated scenario.

Obviously, China does not want to bear such reputations as "bullying small countries" or "seeking hegemony in the South China Sea." An impression of a peacefully rising China fits the country's global strategy. But if the Philippines and Vietnam, instigated by the US and Japan, cause a nuisance and step over China's red line, China will not remain restrained.

The Philippines and Vietnam are well aware of this. With China's increasing capabilities in the South China Sea, they will behave more cautiously.

The rivalry in the South China Sea is a highly technical diplomatic game and strategic contest. The public opinion should lend support, and Chinese decision-makers must be specialized diplomatic and strategic institutions. The Chinese public needs to know the real pattern of strength in the South China Sea and acknowledge that China has ample room to maneuver over the Philippines and Vietnam.

The strategy of the Philippines is to whine to the world about China's "bullying" so as to hinder China's global strategy. Hence it has formed an accord with Washington and Tokyo.

China has succeeded in its land reclamation projects on the Nansha Islands. This is an outcome of China's diplomatic specialization. It is reasonable and legitimate. The US and the Philippines can do nothing about it despite voicing objections.

The South China Sea should be an area where Chinese society can find confidence after experiencing long-time sufferings and setbacks. A big country not only owns its strength, but also has a broad mindset and wisdom to count its losses and gains.

Daniel Russel’s S.China Sea remarks absurd

US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel Tuesday criticized China's policy on the South China Sea in Washington. These comments may sound reasonable to nonprofessionals but are not even worth refuting by legal experts.

Russel claimed that China misunderstood US neutrality and stressed that Washington only maintains neutrality with regard to the competing claims in the area. But when it comes to "adhering to international law," the US will not be neutral and will "come down forcefully." The US backs the Philippines' lawsuit to the international maritime tribunal and said the arbitration will be binding for both China and the Philippines.

It is necessary for the US to elaborate what article of international law that China's land reclamation activities in the Nansha Islands have violated and what forceful coercion China's engineering ships have done to neighboring countries.

By claiming both China and the Philippines need to accept the decision of the arbitral tribunal, Russel has deliberately misguided public opinion. Despite joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, China submitted a declaration in 2006, stating that China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in Article 298 of the Convention, which includes territorial disputes. Thirty-six countries, including South Korea, have made similar statements.

It's perfectly legal for China not to accept the arbitral tribunal's decision; in fact, forcing China to accept or abide by the arbitration result is illegal. Russel claimed the South China Sea issue has caused serious conflict between China and the US. But it needs to be pointed out that the conflict is at China's door, which is 12 time zones away from Washington. The conflict is actually imposed by Washington on us.

There are numerous claimants to the Nansha Islands. It's impossible for China to give up its sovereign claim; however, it didn't attempt to militarily expel Manila and Hanoi from the islands they illegally occupy. The Philippines deliberately stranded an old navy ship in China's Ren'ai Reef in 1999. It initially pledged to salvage the ship, but later on rascally reneged on this by reinforcing the ship. China has exercised restraint over the years. But Washington openly supports Manila's occupation of Ren'ai Reef. Where is the justice?

Chinese people never actually bank on Washington's neutrality, which doesn't exist at all. The US's South China Sea strategy serves its geopolitical purpose. Through lending support to Manila and Hanoi, it can realize its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. South China Sea claimants have maintained the peace despite conflicts. The future situation will depend on how Sino-US competition develops, especially what intentions the US has in the South China Sea. As long as Washington doesn't want the tension to escalate, there will be hope for peace.

Swift’s South China Sea flight can only fool Manila

During his visit to the Philippines Saturday, Scott Swift, newly appointed US commander of the Pacific Fleet, joined a surveillance mission on board a P-8A Poseidon plane to observe the aircraft's full range of capabilities in the South China Sea. The US Navy released photos of Swift taking a bird's eye view of the South China Sea, but did not mention if the aircraft had flown over disputed areas.

The Philippine side soon welcomed Swift's move, believing it was a gesture from its US ally to aid its claims to the disputed territories with China.

Swift must have felt that he was the overlord of the South China Sea, as he merely flew over the area but the flight got various interpretations from the Philippine side and regional observers. Washington is an external player that can only exert limited influence to strike a balance over the South China Sea issue. That the US could extend its authority by "inspecting" the South China Sea would only be the illusion of a small number of Americans and Filipinos.

We have noticed that the US Navy has kept much lower key than two months ago when it released details that its reconnaissance plane had approached the Chinese islands under construction. It is estimated that the US will not behave inappropriately in the South China Sea before the meeting of the US and Chinese heads of states in September. But in the long run, its competition with China in the area is unavoidable.

China is accustomed to the frequent petty actions of the US in the South China Sea and is getting itself ready for the troubles stirred up by the US there. China is also improving its abilities in coping with the issue as well.

Most observers hold that while the US wants to strengthen the allies' trust, it does not have the excuse and determination to square off with China. Hence the contradictory and chaotic messages it conveys. Most importantly, Washington does not admit the facts. China has exercised much restraint in the South China Sea and its land reclamation does not violate international law, leaving others no excuse to prevent the move. But the US puts on a posture of involvement while it can unlikely take any substantial action, putting itself in an awkward position.

Manila is even worse. How can it be possible that the Philippines' disputes with China are resolved by the US? Does Manila think that China would acknowledge its unreasonable territorial claims after Swift's flight or if the US sends more navy ships? It would be overly simplistic if Manila thinks this way.

Recently a fictional post circulating on Chinese social media reflects the mentality of the Chinese public that China will not start up conflicts with the Philippines. But if Manila oversteps the red line for any reason, Beijing will strike back regardless of Washington's attitude.

It is understandable that the US hopes to maintain its clout in the area and the Philippines wants to counter China by roping in the US. But they need to mind the boundaries. The Philippines needs to be cautious in the area, as China has been.

Sources: Global Times

The truth about the South China Sea disputes: Vietnam and Philippine hyping up tensions

Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi (left) shakes hands with Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh (right) at the Vietnamese government's guesthouse in Hanoi on Saturday. Photo: AFP

Hanoi told to halt Xisha hype

No breakthrough was made during the Wednesday meeting of Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, but experts hope tension between the nations will at least ease up. 

At Vietnam's invitation, Yang co-hosted the chairmen's meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation in Hanoi, an inter-governmental mechanism set up for coordinating bilateral relations.

He also met with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and Communist Party of Vietnam General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong later on Wednesday.

"The difficulties China and Vietnam face at the moment are because Vietnam has continually illegally harassed Chinese drilling operations in the waters near the Xisha Islands for more than a month," Yang said during the meeting with Minh.

 FM releases photos of Vietnam ship hitting Chinese patrol vessel

Yang stressed that the Xisha Islands are inherent territory of China and there are no disputes in this area. "The most urgent thing is for Vietnam to stop its interference and harassment, stop hyping up the issue and stop whipping up disagreement to create new disputes, and properly deal with the aftermath of the recent serious incidents of violence," Yang said.

No progress was made during the discussion, as the two sides insisted on their opposing positions, an anonymous Vietnamese official familiar with the talks was quoted as saying by the Associated Press.

Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Hainan Province, told the Global Times that it is predictable that Vietnam would insist on its stance as it claimed sovereignty over the Xisha Islands in a law passed in 2012.

"This one-time meeting alone can't solve all the problems the two countries face. However, the fact that these annual meetings have continued in spite of the South China Sea tension is already a good sign. It proves that both sides have a friendly intention to solve the dispute," said Gu Xiaosong, an expert on Southeast Asian studies at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences.

These are the highest-level talks between China and Vietnam after relations began to sour over the vessel ramming around the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in May.

Vietnamese protests against the oil rig worsened into violent riots against Chinese nationals and businesses in southern and central Vietnam, which led to the deaths of four Chinese nationals. China has since announced the suspension of some bilateral exchange plans.

China's foreign ministry released substantial evidence earlier this month, including an official note from Vietnam's then-premier Pham Van Dong in 1958, to prove that Vietnam acknowledged China's sovereignty over the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands at the time. Vietnam later reneged on its words.

Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung said last month that Vietnam was considering legal action against China over the disputed waters.

"Vietnam needs to assess the impact on itself if they sue China, as the [previous] evidence will prove China's claim. Vietnam stands more to lose in a bitter bilateral relationship with China. It should remain calm and exercise restraint to solve the disputes via negotiations," Wu noted.  - Global Times

Vietnam says it has evidence to prove its claim in South China Sea but is ignoring own historical documents that vindicate China's position

Vietnam has been using China-Vietnam clashes in the South China Sea, and distorting facts, fanning passions and playing up the "China threat" theory, to vilify China. Ignoring the overall development of Beijing-Hanoi relationship, Vietnam is pretending to be a "victim" in the South China Sea dispute, saying it is prepared to seek international arbitration on the issue.

Vietnamese leaders have said that they have enough historical evidence to justify Vietnam's sovereignty over "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands, claiming that Vietnam has been the "master" of the two islands since the 17th century. It seems like they have lifted their remarks straight out of a white paper "Truth of China-Vietnam Relationship over 30 Years", issued by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in 1979 when bilateral ties were not normal. Worse, almost all the arguments in that 1979 document were copied from a "white paper" issued by the Saigon-based puppet South Vietnam regime (or the Republic of Vietnam) in February 1974.

Now the Vietnamese leaders, using the so-called historical documents, are trying to claim that Vietnam's "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands are actually China's Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. The fact is that, the islands recorded in Vietnamese documents refer to some other islands surrounding Vietnam instead of the Xisha and Nansha islands.

To encroach on China's territory in the 1970s, the South Vietnam regime distorted historical facts, which were adopted by later Vietnamese leaders for political purposes. This has complicated the issue and caused serious damage to Sino-Vietnamese ties.

A look at the evidence presented in China's diplomatic documents in the late 1970s and early 1980s will reveal the truth. In fact, even some Vietnamese scholars have said that the documents cited by Vietnam to claim sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha islands are not genuine historical records but edited versions of originals, confirming China's sovereignty over the islands.

Vietnamese leaders said China forcibly occupied the entire "Huangsha Islands" in 1974, which were then controlled by the Saigon regime. The Saigon regime had kicked up a row over the naval battle that broke out in 1974 in the waters around China's Xisha Islands and sought military support from its ally, the United States, and requested the UN Security Council's intervention. But neither the US nor the UN Security Council acceded to the Saigon regime's request. This means the international community, including the US, has never believed in Vietnam's complaints or claims.

On Sept 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi. In January 1950, the People's Republic of China became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnam. For China and a vast majority of the other countries, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), was (and has been) the only legitimate government of Vietnam, and the government of South Vietnam, a puppet regime installed by French colonialists and American imperialists.

So now, about 39 years after defeating the Americans, why does the Socialist Republic of Vietnam want to use the Saigon regime's claim to create trouble in the South China Sea? Aren't the current Vietnamese leaders betraying Ho Chi Minh and other freedom fighters, profaning the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who laid down their lives to resist foreign aggressors, and negating the valued support of their allies in the battle against colonialism by citing the comprador Saigon regime's claim?

The Vietnamese government must not violate the principle of estoppel in the Xisha and Nansha islands' sovereignty issue. Vietnamese leaders claim that no country recognizes that the Xisha and Nansha islands belong to China. This is a brazen lie, because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam topped the list of countries that accepted China's sovereignty over the islands.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's position was unequivocal in the 1950s and 1960s. The position remained unchanged even after the death of Ho Chi Minh and the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Documents with the Chinese Foreign Ministry from the 1970s and 1980s show the position of the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese Communist Party on the Xisha and Nansha islands. The most important of these documents is a note given by former Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong to Zhou Enlai and the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1965.

On Sept 4, 1958, the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China said that the breadth of the territorial sea of the country shall be 12 nautical miles and that this provision should apply to all territories of the PRC, including all the islands in the South China Sea. On Sept 14, 1958, Pham Van Dong solemnly stated in his note to Zhou Enlai that Vietnam recognizes and supports the Declaration of the Government of the PRC on the country's territorial sea. On Sept 22, 1958, the diplomatic note was publicly published in Nhan Dan, the official newspaper of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

On May 9, 1965, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a statement on the US' definition on the "theater of war" in Vietnam. The statement said that by defining the whole of Vietnam and the waters up to 100 nautical miles off its coast as well as part of the territorial sea of China's Xisha Islands as the operational area of the US armed forces, Lyndon Johnson, then US president, has directly threatened the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its neighbors.

In recent years, however, some Vietnamese government officials and "scholars" have tried to "reinterpret" the two government documents, only to end up making fools of themselves. And after their attempts failed, the Vietnamese government started pretending as if the two documents never existed.

Vietnam has said that it is fully prepared with historical and legal evidence to prove its claim in the South China Sea, and it is waiting for the appropriate time to take China to the international court of justice. If that is so, then Vietnam should not forget to attach Pham Van Dong's note and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's statement, as well as the maps and textbooks published by Vietnam before 1975, with its complaint.

By Ling Dequan (China Daily), a researcher with the Research Center of World Issues, affiliated to Xinhua News Agency

Related:  China blasts comments on S China Sea controversy

Chinese envoy rebuts Vietnamese, Philippine accusations over South China Sea

Wang Min (L Front), China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, addresses the meeting of state parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at the UN headquarters in New York June 13, 2014. Wang Min on Friday forcefully refuted accusations made by Vietnam and the Philippines against China over the South China Sea situation, holding the two countries responsible for any disputes. He slammed Vietnam and the Philippines for infringing upon Chinese territories. (Xinhua/Niu Xiaolei)

UNITED NATIONS, June 13 (Xinhua) -- A Chinese envoy on Friday forcefully refuted accusations made by Vietnam and the Philippines against China over the South China Sea situation, holding the two countries responsible for any disputes.

At the meeting of state parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) held here, Wang Min, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, slammed Vietname and the Philippines for infringing upon Chinese territory.

Wang said that on May 2, a Chinese company's HYSY 981 drilling rig started its drilling operation inside the contiguous zone of China's Xisha Islands for oil and gas exploration. Vietnam sent a large number of vessels, including armed ones, to the site, illegally and forcefully disrupting the Chinese operation for over 1,400 times so far.

"What Vietnam did seriously infringed upon China's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, grossly violated relevant international laws, including the UNCLOS, undermined the freedom and safety of navigation in the related waters, and damaged regional peace and stability," said Wang, who also heads the Chinese delegation to the meeting.

In mid-May, with the connivance of the Vietnamese government, thousands of Vietnamese outlaws committed sabotage against foreign companies, including Chinese ones, in Vietnam, brutally killing four Chinese nationals, injuring over 300 others and causing heavy property losses, Wang added.

"Till now, Vietnam still has not responded to our legitimate demand," he noted.

The envoy pointed out that lies can never eclipse truth, nor can publicity stunts provide a legal cloak for illegal actions.

"What Vietnam needs to do now is to respect China's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, immediately stop all forms of disruptions of the Chinese operation and withdraw all vessels and personnel from the site, so as to ease the tension and restore tranquility on the sea as early as possible," Wang said.

He reiterated that Xisha Islands are an inherent part of China's territory, and are under effective jurisdiction of the Chinese government.

"There's no dispute about them," he said, pointing to the fact that all the successive Vietnamese governments prior to 1974 had formally acknowledged Xisha islands as part of China's territory since ancient times.

"Now the Vietnamese government is going back on its word and making territorial claims over China's Xisha Islands," Wang said, noting that Vietnam is reneging on its own promises, saying one thing today and denying it tomorrow.

"Our ancestors told us, trustworthiness is of paramount importance in state-to-state relations," he quoted.

"We would like to ask: how could Vietnam be trusted by the international community and how could Vietnam's international commitments be taken seriously in the future?" Wang said, referring to Vietnam's action as a violation of estoppel, a basic principle in the international law.

With regard to all the false accusations made by the Philippines against China, Wang pointed out the root cause of the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea is the Philippines' illegal occupation of some islands and reefs belonging to China's Nansha islands.

"The Philippines attempts to legalize its infringements and provocations by dragging China into arbitral proceedings," he said. "The Philippines is also trying to win international sympathy and support through deception. This is what the problem is in essence."

The ambassador noted that pursuant to the provisions of UNCLOS, the Chinese government made a declaration in 2006, excluding disputes over maritime delimitation and territorial sovereignty from compulsory dispute settlement procedures.

"As a sovereign state and a state party to UNCLOS, China has the right under international law to do this. China does not accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines," Wang said, stressing that China's position based on the provisions of the international law will not change.

"China appreciates the efforts made by the majority of ASEAN countries to preserve regional peace and stability," he said. "We will continue working with ASEAN countries to strictly act on the DOC (the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea), promote practical cooperation, enhance mutual trust and jointly uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea."

Source: Xinhuanet

Related:

The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam's Provocation and China's Position

Video: History of Chinese sovereignty over the Xisha Islands

HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam's Provocation and China's Position

BEIJING, June 8 (Xinhua) -- China's Foreign Ministry released an article about the HYSY 981 drilling rig in the Xisha Islands on its website on Sunday. The full text is as follows:  Full story

China sends note to UN chief to clarify Xisha situation

UNITED NATIONS, June 9 (Xinhua) -- A Chinese envoy on Monday sent a note to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, presenting documents making clear Vietnam's provocation and China's stance regarding the Xisha Islands in the South China Sea.

In the note, Wang Min, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, also asked Ban to circulate the documents, as UN General Assembly documents, among all UN member states.  Full story

• Giving shape to Asia's new order

America wants to preserve the status quo in which its leading position remains the keystone of the regional order, and the Chinese acceptance of US leadership is the basis of US-China relationship.

• Region needs new security set-up

We should promote overall security in the Asia-Pacific, work tirelessly to expand the scope of security cooperation, enrich its concept, deepen its level and establish a new security cooperation mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Pitching for the Asean 10

Asean countries are still developing because there is still much to do, and much to learn about how to do it.

IF Asean is sometimes accused of being a talking shop, it also vividly demonstrates the value and virtues of some talking shops.

Officials’ meetings at various levels are legion, growing in number and scope over half a century until they average a few a day for every day of the year.

Between these are the summits, being more prominent in comprising heads of governments. Besides the content of the proceedings, the frequency of the summits themselves may indicate the state of the South-East Asian region.

When leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand met in Bangkok in 1967 to found Asean, that was somehow not considered a summit. So the “first” summit came only in 1976 in Bali, with the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia” and the “Declaration of Asean Concord.”

The second summit came the following year in Kuala Lumpur, coinciding with an Asean-Japan dialogue. Although this was only one year after the first, it was a whole decade after Asean’s founding and would be another full decade before the next.

The third summit (Manila, 1987) decided to hold summits every five years. By the seventh (Bandar Seri Begawan) it would be every year, then after skipping 2006 the Philippines hosted the 12th in Cebu amid local protests.

The 14th summit slated for 2008 in Thailand was postponed to early 2009 over domestic disturbances, then put off for another two months in the broken Pattaya gathering. From then on, summits would be biannual affairs.

Between and beyond the summits, whether or not local scandals and protests add to the news value of Asean gatherings, the original five member nations seem to attract more attention if not also more interest. This is anomalous since Asean membership confers equal status on all members regardless of size, age, clout or political system.

The newer members can actually be quite pivotal in their own way, as Vietnam and then Cambodia had been, and as Myanmar may be now. And several of the older members need not be particularly significant to the Asean 10 as a whole, much less beyond.

With such issues in mind, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Studies Group last week held another roundtable conference in Kuala Lumpur on how relations between Malaysia and the CLM countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) can contribute to Asean consolidation.

An earlier roundtable comprised delegates from Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in assessing how their countries’ relations with Malaysia could progress in the same vein. Vietnam, as the largest and most developed of Asean’s newer CLMV members, had also introduced reforms earliest to qualify to join the earlier dialogue with some of the original members.

Other CLMV countries have progressed on other fronts on their own. It is now 20 years since Cambodia, for example, reached agreement with Malaysia on visa-free travel.

Laos is another country that Malaysia has assisted, with the establishment of bilateral relations (in 1966) even before Asean was founded. Since then, relations have flourished, particularly after Malaysia worked to welcome Vientiane into Asean.

Myanmar today is still undergoing a transition, and therefore also very much a focus of world media attention. Its people now have a greater sense of nationhood following a raft of reforms, mindful of the national interest from economic priorities to the prerogative of rejecting foreign military bases on its soil.

A Malaysian delegate said that the US, following news reports last Sunday, was now looking for a suitable site for a new “missile shield” system in the region. The US and China were the two proverbial “elephants in the room”, and the geopolitical rivalry between them very much an issue for all delegates.

No individual, organisation or country at the roundtable, whether officially or unofficially, was left undisturbed by major power rivalry contaminating the Asean region. This was the more so when preparations abroad tended to centre around a military build-up, with the US “pivot to Asia” involving stationing 60% of its military assets in the Asia-Pacific.

According to one recent analysis, at current and anticipated rates China’s economy could surpass the US’ as early as 2016, and US overall decline could become evident by 2020. Ironically, as with its former Soviet adversary before it, the decline would be underscored by excessive military expenditure and a warlike mindset.

Given these scenarios, it is important to be reminded of some pertinent underlying issues. These may be framed by some telling questions that must be asked, for which answers are vitally needed.

First, are the CLM countries necessarily more dependent on a regional superpower-as-benefactor like China economically, compared to Asean’s older and more developed members. Not so, especially when considering that the latter, with larger economies, have more at stake in dealing with a rising China.

Second, is China even likely to consider challenging US dominance in the region? Despite occasionally dire pronouncements by some there is no evidence of that, indeed quite the reverse: beyond assertions of its old maritime claims, Beijing’s relations with all countries in the region have been progressing and progressive.

US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific is often credited with keeping the regional peace, particularly in the high seas. Is this assumption merited if piracy and terrorism are not included in the calculus, since there may not be any other military force out to wreak havoc in the region post-1945?

Fourth, how much value is there still in the assumption that the US military posture is and will remain the status quo entity in the region? The status quo is helping China’s economy grow, with secure shipping and harmonious development, while the US economy is continually taxed by its large and growing military presence.

Fifth, and by extension, how much pulling power is there today in US efforts at soliciting allies? The problem with enlisting in an alliance for other countries is that to be identified as an ally of a major power is also to identify as an ally against another major power.

Dividing the region in Cold War fashion does not help anyone, and never did. To enlist with a (relatively) declining superpower creates further problems of its own for such allies.

Sixth, can China’s reported flexing of its muscles in the South China Sea and the East China Sea in any way be a show of strength? Since it only gives Beijing a negative image just as it needs to look good, without any gain in return, it is instead a point of weakness.

Seventh, can US efforts to contain China ever work? There is no shortage of instances that verify containment, a situation confirmed by official denials.

So, eighth, why try to contain China at all when in the process the US only loses goodwill before losing face? Perhaps old habits die hard, but more likely the military-industrial complex dies harder.

Smaller countries in Asean and elsewhere have much to learn from the major powers, notably the US and China. Sadly, the lessons are just as much what not to do as they are about what to do.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES By BUNN NAGARA sunday@thestar.com.my

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Restoring unity at South China Sea

I DON’T usually pay attention to Asean meetings as there are so many of them but the disappointing outcome of the recently concluded Asean Ministers Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh caught my attention.

The failure of the meeting to come up with a joint communiqué was striking even to casual observers.

The failure, the first in the bloc’s 45-year history, caused by disagreement among Asean members over the South China Sea dispute, was a worrying development that has cast doubts over its ability to speak in unison on this thorny issue.

The last thing Asean needs is to be caught in a turf war for superpowers in its own backyard.

The South China Sea, which is so crucial not only to the littoral states but to the international community at large, could well be that stage.

China has been seen by many as acting “assertively” in backing its claim of the sea and has been involved in several stand-offs with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have also reacted strongly against China in those situations.

I wonder if Malaysia, as a claimant state, should start thinking of having in place specific contingency plans to confront the kinds of situation that Vietnam and the Philippines have faced against China.

I know Malaysia enjoys close bilateral and people-to-people relations with China. Beijing has even described us as a “special friend”.

Despite this, let us be reminded that China also has deep relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.

It even has nearly inextricable economic and strategic relations with the United States, a potential adversary and with whom it has clashing interests in the sea.

I am not schooled in the fine art of international relations but I believe nations should not always think the best of others and must be prepared to face any eventuality.

In the context of the South China Sea, such eventualities should include facing potentially hostile and intrusive acts of our neighbours which can undermine our interests.

Any one of the claimant states can turn adversarial but I believe we have to pay special attention to China.

Its recent actions such as patrolling disputed waters and deploying a garrison at Sansha city to impose its jurisdiction all point towards Beijing’s readiness and resolve to assert its claims.

What would Malaysia do should we find the cables of our offshore exploration vessels cut by a Chinese vessel or if Chinese surveillance and patrol vessels appear in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), situations which Vietnam and the Philippines have faced?

I believe Malaysia should prepare contingency plans to face such situations. Merely reacting to developments in this high-stake theatre would not be good enough.

The tense situation underscores the need for a binding code to govern the behaviour of the claimants.
Such a code will compel them to settle their disputes through peaceful means and using international law.

While I noticed progress between Asean and China to come up with guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the sea between them, they still have a long way to go before they can agree on a Code of Conduct.

On the outcome of the AMM meeting in Phnom Penh and China’s refusal to discuss disputes multilaterally, I foresee a prolonged impasse. At the rate things are going, I don’t see China changing tangent of not wanting to discuss the dispute multilaterally.

The Code of Conduct that Asean and China are working to establish would not be efficient if it did not include all the claimants. In this regard, one wonders if it would make sense to include Taiwan, which is also a claimant in the sea, to be a party to such a code.

It would not make sense to ignore this claimant in the construct of a code to govern the conduct of claimant states. What set of conduct then would Taiwan be subjected to if the Code of Conduct is agreed only between Asean and China?

Besides ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules, bringing Taiwan into the fold could help yield fresh perspectives to the discourse on disputes at sea, which to me seems to be getting nowhere.

Taiwan has much to offer in areas such as marine scientific research, fishery management/conservation, environmental protection, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and search and rescue.

The claimant and littoral states could tap into Taiwan’s expertise in these areas and promote cooperation, build confidence and avert further tension.

I hope my take on the subject would provide food for thought to claimant states and prompt them to set aside differences and work together towards peace.

I believe Malaysia as a claimant state should not only be steadfast in safeguarding its interests but should also show initiative to promote peace.

Malaysia can leverage its position as a founding member of Asean and as a friend to claimant states and the United States to be a voice of reason.

With the statesmanship skills of our diplomats we can help restore unity in Asean that was shaken in the aftermath of the AMM in Phnom Penh, restore confidence between Asean and China, and reassert Asean’s centrality in regional security matters.

SON OF THE SEA

Kuala Lumpur

China Pushes on the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses

Publication: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 15

August 3, 2012

By: Ian Storey

China and ASEAN Much Further Apart than the Smiles Suggest

For more than two decades Beijing has pursued a consistent policy in the South China Sea composed of two main elements: gradually strengthening the country’s territorial and jurisdictional claims while at the same time endeavoring to assure Southeast Asian countries of its peaceful intentions. Recent moves by China to bolster its maritime claims have brought the first element into sharp relief, while reassurances of benign intent have, however, been in short supply. Indeed, far from assuaging Southeast Asian concerns regarding its assertive behavior, China has fuelled them by brazenly exploiting divisions within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its own national interests.

China Hardens Its Stance

Commentaries in China’s state-run media analyzing the South China Sea issue have become markedly less conciliatory. Opinion pieces highlight several new themes in China’s official line. One theme is that China’s territory, sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests increasingly are being challenged by Southeast Asian nations and Japan in the South and East China Seas. China’s response, it is argued, should be to uphold its claims more vigorously, increase its military presence in contested waters, and, if necessary, be prepared to implement coercive measures against other countries. As one commentary notes “Cooperation must be in good faith, competition must be strong, and confrontation must be resolute” (Caixin, July 13).

Another theme is that, while China has shown restraint, countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have been pursuing provocative and illegal actions in a bid to “plunder” maritime resources such as hydrocarbons and fisheries which China regards as its own (China Daily, July 30).

A third theme is that Manila and Hanoi continue to encourage U.S. “meddling” in the South China Sea and that the United States uses the dispute as a pretext to “pivot” its military forces toward Asia (Global Times, July 11). To reverse these negative trends, Chinese commentators have urged the government to adopt more resolute measures toward disputed territories and maritime boundaries. Nationalist sentiment, they argue, demands no less.

Recent measures undertaken by the Chinese authorities do indeed suggest a more hard-line position. Ominously, some of the initiatives have included a strong military element, presumably as a warning to the other claimants that China is ready to play hardball.

Perhaps the most noteworthy attempt by China to bolster its jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea was the raising of the administrative status of Sansha from county to prefecture level in June. Sansha originally was established in 2007 as an administrative mechanism to “govern” the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands. Sansha’s elevation was an immediate response to a law passed on June 21  by Vietnam’s national assembly, which reiterated Hanoi’s sovereignty claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. Both Vietnam and China protested the other’s move as a violation of their sovereignty (Bloomberg, June 21). Less than a month later, Sansha’s municipal authorities elected a mayor and three deputy mayors and China’s Central Military Commission authorized the establishment of a garrison for “managing the city’s national defense mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations (Xinhua, July 20).

Earlier, in late June, China’s Defense Ministry announced it had begun “combat ready” patrols in the Spratly Islands to “protect national sovereignty and [China’s] security development interests” (Reuters, June 28). Embarrassingly for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, however, on July 13, one of its frigates ran aground on Half Moon Shoal, 70 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan and within the Philippines 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The frigate was refloated within 24 hours, suggesting that other PLA Navy vessels were nearby when the incident occurred. These developments provide further evidence of the growing militarization of the dispute.

China also has moved to undercut the claims and commercial activities of the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea in other ways.

In June, the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited foreign energy companies to bid for exploration rights in nine blocks in the South China Sea. The blocks lie completely within Vietnam’s EEZ and overlap with those offered for development to foreign energy corporations by state-owned PetroVietnam. Accordingly, Hanoi vigorously protested CNOOC’s tender (Bloomberg, June 27). More importantly the blocks are located at the edge of China’s nine-dash line map and seem to support the argument that Beijing interprets the dashes as representing the outermost limits of its “historic rights” in the South China Sea. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), however, coastal states are not entitled to “historic rights” on the high seas. It is therefore unlikely that any of the major energy giants will bid for CNOOC’s blocks—although smaller companies may do so if only to curry favor with Beijing with a view to landing more lucrative contracts down the road. If, however, exploration does move forward in any of the nine blocks, a clash between Vietnamese and Chinese coast guard vessels will become a very real possibility.

On the issue of ownership of Scarborough Shoal, scene of a tense standoff between Chinese and Philippines fishery protection vessels in May-June, China position remains uncompromising. At the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi restated China’s sovereignty claims to the shoal, rejected the notion that it was disputed and accused Manila of “making trouble” (Xinhua, July 13). According to the Philippine foreign ministry, Chinese trawlers―protected by Chinese paramilitary vessels—continue to fish in waters close to Scarborough Shoal in contravention of a bilateral accord whereby both sides agreed to withdraw their vessels [1].

Following the ARF, China kept up the pressure on the Philippines. In mid-July, it dispatched a flotilla of 30 fishing trawlers to the Spratlys escorted by the 3,000-ton fisheries administration vessel Yuzheng 310 (Xinhua, July 15). The trawlers collected coral and fished near Philippine-controlled Pag-asa Island and Chinese-controlled Mischief and Subi Reefs (Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 27). The Philippine authorities monitored the situation but took no action.

The Phnom Penh Debacle

In the past, after China has undertaken assertive actions in the South China Sea it has tried to calm Southeast Asia’s jangled nerves. At the series of ASEAN-led meetings in Phnom Penh in mid-July, however, Chinese officials offered virtually no reassurances to their Southeast Asian counterparts. Worse still, China seems to have utilized its influence with Cambodia to scupper attempts by ASEAN to address the problem, causing a breakdown in ASEAN unity.

In the final stages of the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers (known as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting or AMM), the Philippines and Vietnam wanted the final communiqué to reflect their serious concerns regarding the Scarborough Shoal incident and the CNOOC tender. They were supported by Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand who felt that ASEAN should speak with one voice. Cambodia—which holds the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and has close political and economic ties with China— objected because, in the words of Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, “ASEAN cannot be used as a tribunal for bilateral disputes” (Straits Times, July 22). Attempts by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to reach a compromise on the wording were unsuccessful and for the first time in its 45-year history the AMM did not issue a final communiqué.

The fallout from the AMM was immediate and ugly. Natalegawa labelled ASEAN’s failure to reach agreement “irresponsible” and that the organization’s centrality in the building of the regional security architecture had been put at risk (Straits Times, July 16). Singapore’s Foreign Minister, K. Shanmugam described the fiasco as a “sever dent” in ASEAN’s credibility (Straits Times, July 14). Cambodia and the Philippines blamed the failure on each other. Cambodia was pilloried by the regional press for its lack of leadership and for putting its bilateral relationship with China before the overall interests of ASEAN. One analyst alleged  Cambodian officials had consulted with their Chinese counterparts during the final stages of talks to reach an agreement on the communiqué [2]. China’s Global Times characterized the outcome of the AMM as a victory for China, which does not think ASEAN is an appropriate venue to discuss the dispute, and a defeat for the Philippines and Vietnam (Global Times, July 16).

A few days after the AMM, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dispatched his foreign minister to five Southeast Asian capitals in an effort to restore ASEAN unity. Natalegawa’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in an ASEAN foreign minister’s statement of July 20 on “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” [3]. The six points, however, broke no new ground and merely reaffirmed ASEAN’s bottom line consensus on the South China Sea. In response to the joint statement, China’s Foreign Ministry said it would work with ASEAN to implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21).

One of the six points calls for the early conclusion of a code of conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea, but the Phnom Penh debacle has made that target highly doubtful.

Although China agreed to discuss a CoC with ASEAN in November 2011, Beijing always has been lukewarm about such an agreement, preferring instead to focus on implementing the DoC. Undeterred, earlier this year ASEAN began drawing up guiding principles for a code and in June agreed on a set of “proposed elements.” While much of the document is standard boiler plate, there are two aspects worthy of attention.

The first is that ASEAN calls for a “comprehensive and durable” settlement of the dispute, a phrase that seems to repudiate Deng Xiaoping’s proposal that the parties should shelve their sovereignty claims and jointly develop maritime resources. Clearly, the four ASEAN claimants have rejected Deng’s formula as it would be tantamount to recognizing China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea atolls.

The second interesting aspect concerns mechanisms for resolving disputes arising from violations or interpretations of the proposed code. The document suggests that disputing parties turn to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) or dispute resolution mechanisms in UNCLOS. Neither, however, would be of much utility. While the TAC does provide for a dispute resolution mechanism in the form of an ASEAN High Council, this clause has never been invoked due to the highly politicized nature of the High Council and the fact that it cannot issue binding rulings. Moreover, although China acceded to the TAC in 2003, Beijing almost certainly would oppose discussion of the South China Sea at the High Council because it would be outnumbered 10 to 1.

UNCLOS does provide for binding dispute resolution mechanisms, including the submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). China always has rejected a role for the ICJ in resolving the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and, in 2006, China exercised its right to opt out of ITLOS procedures concerning maritime boundary delimitation and military activities.

On July 9, Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying had indicated to ASEAN foreign ministers that China was willing to start talks on a CoC in September. Two days later, however, as ASEAN wrangled over their final communiqué, Foreign Minister Yang seemed to rule this out when he stated discussions could only take place “when the time was ripe” (Straits Times, July 11). At present ASEAN and China are not scheduled to hold any meetings on the CoC, though officials currently are discussing joint cooperative projects under the DoC.

If and when the two sides do sit down to discuss the CoC, it is probable that Beijing will demand all reference to dispute resolution be removed on the grounds that the proposed code is designed to manage tensions only and that the dispute can only be resolved between China and each of the other claimants on a one-on-one basis. Taken together, these developments have dimmed seriously the prospect of China and ASEAN reaching agreement on a viable code of conduct for the South China Sea any time soon. As such, the status quo will continue for the foreseeable future. 

Notes:

1. “Why There was no ASEAN Joint Communique,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, July 19, 2012 http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/5950-why-there-was-no-asean-joint-communique-.
2. Ernest Bower, “China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20 2012.
3. “Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,” Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012 http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/mofa/default.aspx?id=3206.

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China pledges to work with ASEAN to safeguard peace in South China Sea

BEIJING: China pledged Friday to make joint efforts with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to safeguard regional peace and stability after the 10-member bloc issued a six-point statement on the South China Sea.

"The Chinese side is willing to work together with the ASEAN members to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) comprehensively and effectively," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said in response to a question on the ASEAN statement.

In the statement issued earlier on Friday, the ASEAN members reaffirmed their commitment to the "peaceful resolution of disputes" in the South China Sea. Analysts said the six-point principles were reached to make up for the lack of a customary communique after a foreign ministers' meeting last week.

In an unprecedented development, the 45th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the ASEAN was not wrapped up with the release of a communique showcasing common ground.

ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Qu Xing, head of the China Institute of International Studies, told Xinhua that it was Vietnam and the Philippines that should be blamed for the failure to pass a communique last week.

"The two countries attempted to turn the disputes between them and China into a problem between China and ASEAN as a whole," he said, "which was unacceptable for the other members of the bloc."

"The Chinese side has noticed the ASEAN's statement on the South China Sea (on Friday)," Hong said, adding that the core problem of the South China Sea was the disputes over the sovereignty of the Nansha islands and the demarcation of the islands' adjacent waters.

"China has sufficient historical and jurisprudential evidence for its sovereignty over the Nansha islands and the adjacent waters," he added.

However, Hong said China is open to consultations with the ASEAN on the conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

"(We) hope that all the parties will strictly abide by the DOC and create necessary conditions and atmosphere for the consultations," he said.

As a signatory to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China attaches importance to safeguarding the principles and mission of the Convention, said the spokesman.

Hong said UNCLOS is aimed to establish a legal order for the seas and oceans "with due regard for the sovereignty of all States," and it does neither serve as an international treaty to address disputes over territorial sovereignty between states nor as evidence used to judge over the disputes.

The countries concerned should address the disputes over the maritime demarcation in the South China Sea, after the land disputes have been resolved, in accordance with historical facts and all international laws including UNCLOS, he added.

"China attaches importance to its ties with the ASEAN," Hong said, adding the country is committed to promoting friendly neighborhood and reciprocal cooperation with the ASEAN to push ahead with the cooperation in East Asia with joint efforts.

The spokesman said China and ASEAN share common interests and responsibilities in keeping Asia's development and maintaining regional peace and stability against the backdrop of the ongoing international financial crisis.

"The two sides should continue to promote their strategic communication in pursuit of a reciprocal and win-win situation, with mutual respect and trust in mind as well as handle the relationship between the two sides from strategic and long-term perspective," he added.

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GUANGZHOU, July 20 (Xinhua) -- China's central military authority has approved to form and deploy a military garrison in the newly established city of Sansha.

Sources with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Guangzhou Military Command said Friday that the Central Military Commission (CMC) had authorized it to form a garrison command in the city.Full story

ASEAN forum not proper platform to discuss South China Sea issue

BEIJING, July 11 (Xinhua) -- As the foreign ministers of the 27 participating parties of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meet in Phnom Penh on Thursday, many eye the talks as a platform to ease the tension over the South China Sea, which has flared up in recent months.

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Editor: Chen Zhi, Xinhua

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Asean has no reason to panic

Asean has no reason to panic

Asean is younger than its member nations, so teething problems as it continues to mature are no cause for alarm.

ASEAN’S set pieces following its meetings have become so predictable as to provoke panic when a blip in the set routine appears unexpectedly.

That happened with the anticipated joint communique following the ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh a week ago. This was the first time a communique was not issued, after disagreement over the text between the Philippines and host Cambodia on Manila’s territorial squabble with Beijing.

That was enough to set tongues wagging, pens wriggling and keyboards clacking about a presumed “turning point” in Asean and even speculation about its imminent demise.

Asean proceedings have traditionally been weighed down by diplomatic gobbledygook just because everyone expects such statements to be issued. What later happens in the conduct of member states, however removed from the spirit and content of the communiques, then becomes quite irrelevant.

Yet the substance of statements issued should be more important than the fact of issuing just any statement. After all, Asean is supposed to be more about political process than mere diplomatic procedure.

Therefore, not issuing a collective statement after this month’s pow wow among foreign ministers is better than issuing a meaningless statement just for the sake of issuing something. It makes no sense to produce a statement in the absence of a joint agreement about what it would say.

As it happened, not issuing a joint communique amounts to an indirect statement on the different positions taken by some members, in this case the hotly disputed claims on island territory between the Philippines (and to some extent Vietnam) and China.

Ironically, the Phnom Penh meeting was supposed to consolidate efforts at establishing an Asean community by 2015, as well as to reaffirm blossoming relations between Asean and China.

It may have failed at delivering either, but simply deviating from the norm by not perpetuating a scripted, choreographed and rehearsed custom regardless of circumstances is not a failure of Asean. Nonetheless, the apparent detour from the objectives of this year’s ministerial meeting was enough to turn surprise into shock for many.

Traditionally criticised for saying little and doing even less with boring predictability, Asean is suddenly seen as risking the unprecedented. Its critics should now make up their mind about the nature of their criticism, because they are beginning to contradict themselves.

The other irony concerns the Asean style itself. The regional organisation has long been assessed less by what it says in communiques than what it leaves unsaid, and understood less by what it does than what it obliquely skirts doing.

Thus going by its record, the decision not to issue a communique may be deemed doubly and traditionally Asean. Yet it was taken to be untypical of Asean.

Cynics predicting doom-and-gloom scenarios for Asean forget that its watchword has always been “resilience”, as supported by its near-half-century record. Asean is made of sterner stuff, to which its experience testifies.

But Asean is also not immune to the pitfalls of complacency. Failure to do what is needed now can escalate current challenges and lead to more problems in the future.

For what it is worth, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono swiftly dispatched Foreign Minister Dr Marty Natalegawa to four Asean capitals, including Kuala Lumpur, to try to cobble together some kind of a belated joint communique.

That may be possible but unlikely, since foreign ministers who refused to be accommodating while together at an official meeting would be even less inclined to compromise when back home. Even if such a statement materialises, it would just be “in absentia” of the assembled ministers, now dispersed, and not a statement “posthumous” of Asean.

Meanwhile, news and commentary about the lack of a communique have overshadowed the issues behind it. And it is not only the absence of a communique that can be seen as untypical of Asean.

Manila and Hanoi had come into the meeting room after a recent diplomatic spat with China over competing territorial claims. Despite the ministerial meeting covering various other matters, the Philippines and Vietnam insisted that their problems with China be included in the text of the joint communique.

Cambodia, as host, refused as it saw this as unbecoming and inappropriate. Only half of the 10 Asean members have disputes over island territory with China, with the dispute in question over Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island involving only one Asean country, the Philippines.

Philippine Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario then openly accused his Cambodian counterpart Hor Namhong of “consistently defending China’s interest.” Point number two in being untypically Asean.

The ill will created extends beyond the scope of any Asean conference. Its import and impact have already spread beyond the few countries involved.

No country can claim victory or savour any sense of satisfaction from these developments, because they work to the detriment of all. There is also the additional risk of some countries misreading the situation to even worse effect.

China had a pie in the face when it began the conference, as an Asean dialogue partner, by celebrating the new priority of taking relations with Asean to greater heights. If it is seeking any consolation from a divided Asean, it will find itself gravely mistaken.

The Philippines is also finding that it has fewer “allies” in this imbroglio than it would have liked. Thailand had already warned it would not let bilateral differences with China upset regional ties with Beijing, while a caucus of retired diplomats in Indonesia criticised the Philippines for being “blunt” and “very un-Asean.”

The other Asean countries are not exactly behind Manila, and likewise some Filipino commentators. Even Vietnam, despite its inter-state disputes with China, has always had quieter, positive inter-party ties as fellow communist nations.

In contrast, the Philippines has only a treaty with the US. That can make matters worse through emboldening Manila in rash actions, or initiating major power conflict in the region.

Now President Benigno Aquino III has passed the handling of the issue from del Rosario to Ambassador Sonia Brady in Beijing to handle more diplomatically. A sense of realism may yet dawn after all.

In the meantime, changes in the region include some that question old ideological allegiances. Diplomats and policymakers need to be sensitive to such developments to respond accordingly.

Not only does Vietnam have serious differences with China, Myanmar may also begin to do so on separate bilateral matters. At the same time, Taiwan increasingly feels at one with China over claims on territory disputed by other countries, such as the one with the Philippines.

Beyond all the conflicting claims, some realities remain.

Asean is only 45 years old as a regional organisation in the global community of nations, so more differences between members are likely to appear in future. These should not be a problem as long as they are manageable.

Disputes are also best settled, or can only be settled, through negotiations or arbitration. Souring the atmosphere by making diplomacy difficult only makes things worse for everyone.

With China, it has been said that upping the ante only strengthens the hand of hardliners in Beijing. Most Asean countries are wise enough to steer clear of that approach, however much of a rush it may give some politicians playing to the gallery at home.

Behind The Headlines By BUNN NAGARA

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