Towards a multi-polar international monetary system

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THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHANG

IMF cannot create sufficient credit to help resolve growing financial crises 

MOST people think of the international monetary system as an architecturally designed system made in Bretton Woods at the end of the Second World War. This may be true for the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, but the existing system is a messy legacy of rules, regulations and foreign exchange systems and institutions that facilitate trade and payments between countries.

Unlike a national monetary system, where there is one currency issued by the national central bank and national agencies responsible for financial stability, there is currently no global central bank, no global financial regulator and no global finance ministry. In short, we have global financial markets, but no global mechanism to deal with periodic crises, except through the (sporadic) consensus views of national policy-makers.

This was not a problem when the United States was the dominant power in the 1950s and 1960s. But this changed when the United States dropped the link to gold in 1971. From then on, the international monetary system was largely driven by decisions between the United States and Europe, which collectively owned the majority of the voting power in the IMF. Needless to say, the emerging markets had little say, since they were the major beneficiaries of aid and funding from the IMF and the World Bank.

In 1975, the Group of Six (G6) formally came into being, comprising the United States, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, with Canada being added to form G7 the next year. Basically G7 leaders met regularly and decided most of the decisions for the international monetary system. The G7 accounted for roughly half of world GDP, but essentially ran the global financial system.

The grouping was only widened in 1997 when the heads of the United Nations, World Bank, IMF and WTO were invited to join the regular G7 meetings. In 1998, Russia was added to form G8, but with the outbreak of the Asian crisis, the need for more global representation let to the formation of G20 in 1999. The G20 collectively account for 80% of world GDP and two-thirds of the world population.



The reason why the international monetary system is not functioning smoothly is that decision-making lies in the hands of sovereign nations, not the global institutions. A unipolar system is alright as long as the dominant power is stable. This is not necessarily true in a multipolar system, because even obvious decisions cannot have consensus, because of different national interests.

If we keep on thinking about reforming the international monetary system in national terms, can we arrive at a more effective system in promoting global trade and payments and maintaining global financial stability?
For example, the debate over the role of the US dollar and the emergence of the renminbi is seen as threats to the status quo. This is understandable, but money and finance are not ends in themselves, but means to an end of global prosperity and stability.

The real question is what is the global financial system supposed to do, and what is the best way to achieve it?

In the immediate post-war period, there was a shortage of US dollars. Hence, the IMF was created to provide liquidity and foreign exchange reserves for the post-war reconstruction. The United States ran current account surpluses, held most of the world's gold reserves and everyone wanted dollars. Today, because of the Triffin Dilemma, the continuous US current account deficits gave rise to the Global Imbalance, thought to be the cause of the current crisis.

One theory goes something like this. East Asia went into crisis in the 1990s, built up large foreign exchange reserves and current account surpluses and these surplus savings reduced global interest rates and caused the advanced markets to lose monetary control. However, that is not the complete story. There is increasing awareness that the global shadow banking credit was pumping out leveraged liquidity that may have caused national monetary policies to lose effectiveness.

In other words, instead of shortage of global liquidity, we have too much liquidity sloshing around global financial markets, so much so that most central banks are debating how to prevent such liquidity creating asset bubbles, banking crises or over-appreciation of the exchange rate that haunted Japan and East Asia. You either deal with this through self-insurance, building up large exchange reserves, or you allow the IMF to become the provider of liquidity when you need it.

Most countries do not like IMF imposing stiff conditions and they discovered quickly that the IMF has no teeth when you are not a borrower.

This is the real dilemma of the current international monetary system. Do we seriously want a global institution to re-balance the global economy through carrots and sticks? If so, each nation would have to give up sovereign power to the IMF.

Currently, the IMF cannot fulfill the disciplinary role against the large shareholders nor can it create credit sufficiently to help resolve the growing financial crises. IMF resources are roughly US$400bil and it would have to be increased by a factor of five, before you have enough resources to deal with the European debt crisis. No single country nor group of countries can deal with such exponential growth of the global financial system, last measured as US$250 trillion in conventional financial assets and US$600 trillion in nominal value of derivatives.

In sum, there are structural issues on the global system to be thought through, before you consider the technical question whether surplus country currencies like the renminbi should be included into the SDR basket of currencies as the global reserve currency.

The reality is that no country will forever be in surplus, and sooner or later, deficit countries will have to borrow from the international pool of savings.

In the absence of a coherent global consensus on what to do, muddling through from crisis to crisis seems to be the likely way forward.

In short, don't expect the dollar dominated system to change a lot unless there is another systems crash.
● Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

Changing the international monetary system

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THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

ON Oct 5, 2011, the Triffin International Conference celebrated the 100th year of birth of Robert Triffin, a Belgian economist who was trained in Harvard, worked in the US Fed, taught in Yale and then returned to Europe to help work on European monetary integration.

He was of course famous for the Triffin Dilemma, defined as the inconsistency between the domestic needs of the reserve currency country and the external needs of the world that uses the reserve currency. Put in another way, Triffin identified that the reserve currency country would have to run a current account deficit in order to provide the world with greater liquidity.

Over the long term, running cumulative current account deficits becomes a large debt overhang that is called the Global Imbalance.

Triffin wrote about the Dilemma in the late 1960s, when the United States was struggling whether to maintain its peg to gold, which it abandoned in 1971. This removed the anchor of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which had been in existence since 1947.

The succeeding Bretton Woods II, or non-system as some critics call it, has become a system of flexible exchange rates, plagued by financial crises every decade in the 1980s (Latin America), 1990s (Mexico and East Asia), 2007-9 (US subprime) and today, the European debt crisis.

Today, there is sufficient awareness that the shift from a unipolar world to a multipolar global financial system carries with it great risks and unknowns. The unipolar world of dominance by the US dollar had a lot of advantages, as long as the US remained the unchallenged hegemonic power. The US dollar became not only the standard unit of account for global trade, but also the deepest and most liquid market and an important store of value.

The price of oil, gold and other important commodities are all measured in US dollars. The US Treasuries market is the most liquid and efficient clearing system, which is one fundamental reason why the dollar remains superior to the euro, which does not have a single eurobond market, being divided into different national (German, French, etc) bond markets.



According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) April 2010 survey data, the US dollar today still accounts for 85% of global foreign exchange trading, compared with 39% for the euro, 19% for yen and 13% for sterling (because FX transactions are paired, total turnover sums up to 200%). By contrast, the Hong Kong dollar accounts for only 2.4% and the yuan 0.9% of turnover.

Because of its dominance in international trade and payments, the US dollar still accounts for nearly two thirds of total foreign exchange reserves. China alone reputedly holds roughly US$2 trillion in US dollar assets in the foreign exchange reserves and holdings by Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises.

In 2009, People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for the use of the SDRs (International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights) as a possible global reserve currency. The logic for a globally issued reserve currency as opposed to a nationally issued reserve currency is impeccable. Nationally issued reserve currencies are subject to the Triffin Dilemma, because countries, however strong, will sooner or later go into deficit.

In other words, the whole global financial system is stable when the national reserve currency country is strong, but it will go into crisis, when the national reserve currency country goes into crisis. This is the current state of affairs.

The four reserve currency countries (US, euro area, Britain and Japan) accounting for just under 60% of world GDP are all in deep trouble. The US is running a current account deficit in excess of 3% of GDP and a fiscal deficit over 9% of GDP in 2011. At the end of 2010, the US had a gross foreign liability of US$22.8 trillion or 157% of GDP. Thank goodness that most of the debt is in US dollars, so that it can devalue its way out of debt.

The euro area as a whole has a smaller current account deficit of 0.5% of GDP, but if you look deeper, there are deep imbalances within the eurozone. Germany, the Netherlands and a few are in surplus, whereas the smaller countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain all have net foreign liabilities exceeding 50% of GDP, an indicator of crisis using the Asian crisis experience as rule of thumb.

Britain has a fiscal deficit of 8.8% of GDP and gross debt of 81% of GDP. Its one advantage relative to the Euro is that it can devalue its way out of debt.

Japan, on the other hand, has a net foreign surplus of 50% of GDP, being a major net lender to the rest of world, since it runs a current account surplus of 2.3% of GDP. Its vulnerability is, however, its large domestic gross debt of 220% of GDP, growing larger every year with fiscal current account deficit of 8.3% of GDP in 2011. This means that the domestic debt is vulnerable to bubble implosion, because if interest rate rises, the debt becomes unsustainable.

In sum, the reserve currency countries are in a double trap. They have to run loose monetary policy to keep interest rates low, so that their fiscal debt will not run out of control. But their central banks also know that exceptionally low interest rates are distorting not only global financial markets, they also have very distortive impact on their domestic resource allocation.

This is the liquidity debt trap that Japan got into in 1990 when its asset market bubble burst following the sharp rise in the yen exchange rate. Japanese GDP growth never fully recovered after that. Reserve country status has not been a privilege, but a curse.

The emerging markets are struggling because the present international monetary system has become unstable and unsustainable. How should this essentially unipolar system be reformed to a multi-polar system where yuan plays a role will be the subject of the next column.

l Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.