Hard to rewrite history

Loose cannon: Takaichi’s war talks have prompted Xi to call Trump to remind him that US and China were allies during WW2. — AFP

Japan’s new gov­ern­ment has had to take a crash course in inter­na­tional dip­lomacy as it learns for­eign policy on the job.

FROM curtailed Chinese tourism revenues to a suspended summit of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean leaders, Tokyo continues to reap the fallout from novice Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s combative style.

Just 17 days into taking office, she unnerved Chinese leaders by suggesting that Japan may attack China if Beijing forcibly reclaimed Taiwan. This was the most extreme declaration by any Japanese leader in decades.

 

Takai­chi’s far-right for­eign policy was not unex­pec­ted given her polit­ical record, but its extent and in com­ing so early in her term raised uncom­fort­able geo­pol­it­ical tem­per­at­ures.

Japan’s liab­il­it­ies in for­eign rela­tions con­tinue to grow, not only with China but also much of Asia dev­ast­ated by its war­time aggres­sion. China reacted most robustly because it suffered Imper­ial Japan’s worst depred­a­tions within liv­ing memory, with tens of mil­lions of civil­ians slaughtered and many more bru­tal­ised.

Unlike Ger­many that has fully atoned for its WWII atro­cit­ies, Japan has not. Takai­chi belongs to an ultrana­tion­al­ist fac­tion of the Lib­eral Demo­cratic Party and is a lead­ing mem­ber of the unre­pent­ant Nip­pon Kaigi (NK) organ­isa­tion that routinely denies Japan’s war crimes and praises its con­victed war crim­in­als as her­oes.

Japan and China may one day fully nor­m­al­ise rela­tions, but not yet. The wounds of war still run deep, their grav­ity fur­ther aggrav­ated by a gov­ern­ment that denies its hor­rors at the highest levels.

Hitler’s Holo­caust still haunts a post­war West that con­tin­ues to

give Israel a blank cheque to do any­thing. Revul­sion at Imper­ial Japan’s even worse mas­sacres in China may take longer to sub­side.

What upsets China fur­ther is Takai­chi’s cava­lier indif­fer­ence to the facts. Most coun­tries includ­ing the US and Japan have long had a one-china policy that does not recog­nise Taiwan as an inde­pend­ent nation, yet Japan’s Com­mon Defence doc­trine she cited for Taiwan applies only to assist­ance for sov­er­eign nations.

This implies that no basis exists for identi­fy­ing Taiwan’s per­ceived secur­ity interests with Japan’s. Even efforts to repu­di­ate Art­icle 9 of Japan’s post­war peace Con­sti­tu­tion through re-inter­pret­a­tion have been denounced by crit­ics as uncon­sti­tu­tional.

Attempts at re-inter­pret­a­tion to allow for greater assert­ive­ness are not widely accep­ted. It remains a highly con­tro­ver­sial issue at home and abroad.

Japan’s hope to become a ‘nor­mal coun­try’ no longer beholden to post­war US tutel­age is neither unreas­on­able nor lim­ited to ultra-con­ser­vat­ives, provided it can acknow­ledge its own past, recog­nise cur­rent real­it­ies and engage its neigh­bours fully with ‘nor­mal’ trust and con­fid­ence. That can­not hap­pen with revi­sion­ist lead­ers who are polit­ic­ally unre­formed and his­tor­ic­ally delu­sional bent on rewrit­ing his­tory.

Takai­chi’s state­ment about pos­sibly attack­ing a China that has not attacked it is reason enough for wide­spread alarm. Japan did pre­cisely that to China and a slew of other coun­tries by people who remain unapo­lo­getic about Pearl Har­bor and other tra­gedies.

That loose and dodgy inter­pret­a­tion of Japan’s national secur­ity interests promp­ted Pres­id­ent Xi to call up his US coun­ter­part and recount how China and the US were once allies in the war against fas­cism. Pres­id­ent Trump then advised Takai­chi to cool off.

Even Asian coun­tries inspired by Japan’s rapid indus­tri­al­isa­tion and eco­nomic growth remain wary of its ultra-nation­al­ists’ fas­cin­a­tion with remil­it­ar­isa­tion. Japan’s post­war rise was made pos­sible only with con­cili­at­ory rela­tions with its neigh­bours.

NK mem­bers have included former Prime Min­is­ters Shinzo Abe and Shi­geru Ishiba, but they have been less extreme than Takai­chi. Fol­low­ing her out­burst last month, Ishiba openly and repeatedly rep­rim­anded her.

Although the late Abe cham­pioned the Us-led Quad­ri­lat­eral Secur­ity Dia­logue (Quad) in try­ing to isol­ate China, he later relen­ted. In 2017 he declared Japan was ready to join the China-led Belt and Road Ini­ti­at­ive (BRI), and the fol­low­ing year Japan was reportedly engaged in sev­eral dozen BRI projects.

After los­ing WWII, Japan’s Yoshida Doc­trine relied on US pro­tec­tion to build its eco­nomic strength, developed the Fukuda Doc­trine to offer a meas­ure of war repar­a­tions, and issued the Murayama State­ment as a means to repair ties with neigh­bours. Now all those efforts may be under­mined, par­tic­u­larly when Trump is seek­ing peace with China and downs­iz­ing alli­ance oblig­a­tions all-round.

How Takai­chi’s admin­is­tra­tion now pro­ceeds with China will decide its own pro­spects. With eco­nomic stag­na­tion already in its fourth dec­ade, the Japan­ese ‘mir­acle’ is over.

But whether Japan then declines or can still thrive will depend on how, and if, it can work with a rising Asia helmed by Chinese entre­pren­eur­ship and pro­ductiv­ity.

Bunn Nagara is Dir­ector and Senior Fel­low at the Renais­sance Stra­tegic Research Insti­tute and Hon­or­ary Fel­low of the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.

 

 

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Getting it right

 

US-china trade needs to improve as much as their bilateral relationship deserves much better, but not at the present rate.

Auto ambition: With limited competition abroad but hypercompetition at home, China’s EV industry has powered ahead. — AFP

T

HE constant stream of major global events can be disorienting, particularly when their consequences spin off to produce secondary effects.

Worse, self-interested politics enters as a disabling narrative to make factual understanding more difficult. How to make sense of all this?

One way is to identify the root causes and critically analyse how they develop and proceed. Factual accuracy in descriptions and definitions always helps, while imprecision makes everything more difficult.

Much relates to a rising China and the state of US-China relations. With the world’s biggest economies, theirs is the most critical bilateral relationship for the world and also the most politically fraught. 

In 2004 China displaced the US as Japan’s main trade partner. The following year it displaced the US as the world’s biggest consumer market.

In 2006 the EU became China’s biggest trade partner while China became the EU’s second-biggest. In 2009 China displaced the US as Africa’s main trade partner, and in 2010 it beat Japan as the world’s second-largest economy.

China’s external trade covered a wide range of goods and services as its productive forces gained critical mass. In the process, industrial clout came not simply from resources and scale but also strong production ecosystems and supply chains, including a skilled workforce.

China quickly developed as the “world’s factory” with the Global North’s industries choosing to relocate production there. They flocked to establish factories in China offering the best returns on investment.

But while foreign companies retained older technology like internal combustion engines (ICE), China prioritised electric vehicles (EVs) to cut air pollution and dependence on imported oil. There was no domestic oil lobby to derail EV development, only government encouragement instead.

With limited competition abroad but hypercompetition at home, China’s EV industry powered ahead. That meant a quick and considerable lead in technology and marketing overseas.

In 2009 China surpassed the US as the world’s largest automobile market. This spanned both ICE vehicles and EVs, with a muted but growing market for the latter.

In 2020 China displaced the US as the EU’s top trading partner. That same year it acquired the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, developed the finest fintech, and had the most companies listed in the Fortune Global 500.

China’s auto production was booming, exploding into a global market hungry for sophisticated yet affordable vehicles. China fulfilled that need better than any other country.

In 2021 Chinese auto exports surpassed South Korea’s, and the following year it displaced Germany as the world’s second-biggest exporter. Within months China beat Japan as the world’s top auto exporter.

Much the same is happening with other sectors, if at different growth rates. China continues rising through the rapid development of multiple industries, particularly when several foreign markets remain unexplored or under-served.

Western automobile manufacturers in China felt a need to work more with Chinese companies, particularly on EVs and hybrids. They prefer joint ventures to discriminatory tariffs or sanctions on Chinese vehicles from their governments.

Yet last April US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited China to complain about “excess capacity” and “overproduction”. It was more a political point than an economic argument.

Excess capacity is surplus productive capability over and above what is needed or appropriate. Overproduction is the additional goods produced and left idle because of insufficient demand.

As the world’s factory with regional markets still untapped, China has no excess capacity or overproduction. High Western tariffs to stifle demand may create a semblance of either, but artificially inducing a situation to accuse Chinese industry of it is dishonest.

Sometimes dumping happens with a specific commodity temporarily, typically for an intermediate or upstream item. But that is different.

After Joe Biden’s administration acted against Chinese EVs, batteries and solar panels, they shifted to markets in Russia, Latin America, Central Asia, Africa and South-East Asia. China is a global producer, and since there is no global overcapacity or overproduction, it is not engaging in either.

Chinese industry’s ultra-competitiveness seriously challenges US industry, notably in the latter’s obsolete business models. Regaining US global competitiveness requires extensive retooling, not distorted narratives.

From 2011, China has consistently been the world’s top patent applicant country. Each year it graduates more STEM students than the US population has in total, having produced the most STEM PhDs every year since 2007.

In 2021 China beat the US in its national share of published high-impact AI papers. In the same year it also displaced the US with the highest national net worth.

Such data from established Western sources also noted in 2023 that China had seven of the world’s top 10 universities conducting leading scientific research. Last year China had six of the world’s top 10 STEM institutions.

The US is now denying students from China study visas. America would be greater in training more American students without restraining others who pay to be there.

By Bunn Nagar,  Director and Senior Fellow of the BRI Caucus (Asia-Pacific), and Honorary Fellow at the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.