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Showing posts with label Xi Jinping. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Xi Jinping. Show all posts

Saturday, December 8, 2018

Huawei CFO arrest violates human rights as US takes aim at Huawei, the real trade war with China

In custody: A profile of Meng is displayed on a computer at a Huawei store in Beijing. The Chinese government, speaking through its embassy in Canada, strenuously objected to the arrest, and demanded Meng’s immediate release. — AP

https://youtu.be/8Uxk0mEonTA

https://youtu.be/sAha76_6YQQ

China urges release of Huawei executive

- In violation of universal human rights


Chinese officials are urging the US and Canada to clarify why Meng Wanzhou, a senior executive of Huawei Technologies, has been detained and to immediately release her, slamming the arrest as a violation of her rights.

Experts said on Thursday that Meng's detention is a move by the US to heat up the ongoing trade war between China and the US.

Meng, who is Huawei's chief financial officer and the daughter of Huawei's founder Ren Zhengfei, was detained as she was transferring flights in Canada, according to information provided by Huawei, one of China's tech giants.

Meng's detention was made following a request by the US, which is seeking her extradition on as yet unspecified charges made by prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York, a Huawei spokesperson told the Global Times on Thursday.

Meng was arrested in Vancouver on Saturday, the New York Times reported on Thursday, citing a spokesperson from Canada's Justice Department.

"China has demanded that the US and Canada immediately clarify the reasons for Meng's detention and to release her," Geng Shuang, spokesperson of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told a daily press briefing on Thursday.

He noted that Chinese consular officials in Canada have already provided assistance to Meng.

Meng's detention, made without any clearly stated charges, is an obvious violation of her human rights, said Geng.

The Chinese Embassy in Canada also said on Thursday morning that it firmly opposes and has made strong protests over the action which has seriously curtailed the rights of a Chinese citizen.

"The Chinese side has lodged stern representations with the US and Canadian side, and urged them to immediately correct the wrongdoing and restore the personal freedom of Meng Wanzhou," the Chinese Embassy in Canada said in a statement published on its website.

A Canadian source with knowledge of the arrest was quoted in the Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail on Thursday as saying that US law enforcement authorities allege that Huawei violated US sanctions against Iran but provided no further details.

Although Meng's detention stems from terms of the US-Canada extradition treaty, the US should not be taking such legal action without providing concrete evidence, especially when it has been trying to restore relations with China, Hao Junbo, a Beijing-based lawyer, told the Global Times on Thursday.

Chinese officials and experts criticized the US for its long-arm jurisdiction, which not only hurts individuals but also enterprises.

Rising obstacles

Huawei has been targeted by the US for many years, from patent infringement lawsuits to political pressure, Xiang Ligang, chief executive of the telecom industry news site cctime.com, told the Global Times on Thursday.

"As the Chinese company grew stronger, it faced more obstacles in foreign markets as it is considered as a threat to local players," he said.

Cisco Systems filed the first lawsuit against Huawei in 2003. Motorola filed a lawsuit accusing Huawei of theft of trade secrets in 2010, according to media reports. The company also faced investigation by the US Congress on security issues.

Since at least 2016, US authorities have been probing Huawei's alleged shipping of US-origin products to Iran and other countries in violation of US export and sanctions laws, Reuters reported in April.

The US also asked its major allies to say 'no' to Huawei equipment, as it was worried about alleged potential Chinese meddling in 5G networks, the Wall Street Journal reported on November 23.

While the company faces rising difficulties in the US market, it has been actively exploring other markets such as the EU and Africa.

It became the world's largest telecom equipment provider in 2017, surpassing Ericsson and ZTE, industry website telecomlead.com reported in March, citing IHS data.

Huawei has a 28 percent market share in the global telecom infrastructure industry, followed by Ericsson and Nokia, which have 27 percent and 23 percent respectively, said the report.

Escalating trade war

The US will not stop countering China's rise in the technology sector and will never drop its hostility toward China's "Made in China 2025" strategy, Wang Yanhui, head of the Shanghai-based Mobile China Alliance, told the Global Times on Thursday.

"Huawei has become another card for the US to play against China in the ongoing trade war," he said.

China and the US announced a trade truce following a meeting between the two countries' top leaders in Buenos Aires on Saturday.

But experts warned that China should be prepared for a long-lasting and heated trade war with the US, as it will continue to attempt to counter China's rising power.

"The latest Huawei incident shows that we should get ready for long-term confrontation between China and the US, as the US will not ease its stance on China and the arrest of a senior executive of a major Chinese tech company is a vivid example," Mei Xinyu, a research fellow with the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, told the Global Times on Thursday.

Huawei said there is very little information about specific allegations and that the company is not aware of any misconduct by Meng.

"The company complies with all laws and regulations in the countries in which it operates, including export control and sanctions laws applied in the UN, the US and the EU," Huawei said. - Global Times by Chen Qingqing

Canada's treatment of Meng Wanzhou in violation of human rights

We hope that Canadian authorities handle the case seriously and properly. We also hope that Ms Meng will be treated humanely and will be bailed out. We would like to see Meng's case being handled properly, so that she can regain her freedom as soon as possible. Chinese society has always respected Canada, and it is sincerely hoped that the way how Canadian authorities handle this matter will live up to Chinese people's expectation and impressions regarding the country.


 With executive's arrest, US wants to stifle Huawei

The Chinese government should seriously go behind the US tendency to abuse legal procedures to suppress China's high-tech enterprises. It should increase interaction with the US and exert pressure when necessary. China has been exercising restraint, but the US cannot act recklessly. US President Donald Trump should rein in the hostile activities of some Americans who may imperil Sino-US relations.

US takes aim at Huawei

 Arrest of telecom giant's CFO escalates US-China tech battle


THE Trump administration’s efforts to extradite the chief financial officer of China’s Huawei Technologies Co over criminal charges mark the start of an even more aggressive phase in the technology rivalry between the United States and China and will increase pressure on Washington’s allies to shun the telecommunications company.

Armed with a US extradition request, Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou on Dec 1, the same day as President Trump was holding a summit with Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping. But White House officials said Trump had no advance knowledge of the arrest, indicating the action was on a separate track from trade talks currently under way between Washington and Beijing.

Meng’s detention underscores a sense of urgency, at the Justice Department and other US agencies, to address what they see as a growing threat to national security posed by China’s ambitions to gain an edge in the tech sector. For years, Washington has alleged the Chinese government could compel Huawei, which supplies much of the world with critical cellular network equipment, to spy or to disrupt communications.

Huawei has long said it is an employee-owned company and isn’t beholden to any government, and has never used its equipment to spy on or sabotage other countries. The Chinese government, speaking through its embassy in Canada, strenuously objected to the arrest, and demanded Meng’s immediate release.

US prosecutors made the extradition request based on a sealed indictment for alleged violations of Iran sanctions that had been prepared for some time, people familiar with the matter said. A federally appointed US overseer, formerly charged with evaluating HSBC Holdings PLC’s anti-money-laundering and sanctions controls, relayed information about suspicious Huawei transactions to federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York, some of the people said.

Meng, the daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, is now in custody in Vancouver, and a bail hearing has been scheduled for Friday, according to a spokesman for Canada’s justice department.

Some worried a lack of coordination on the various strands of the Trump administration’s China initiatives could be counterproductive, especially if Trump decides to use the detention of Meng as leverage to extract concessions in the trade talks. The two sides agreed on a 90-day window from the Dec 1 summit to settle a trade dispute that has seen the two sides exchange tit-for-tat tariffs on each other’s goods.

“I’m very concerned that that’s just going to ratchet this trade war and make negotiations much more difficult,” said Gary Locke, former US ambassador to China. “This is I think a really hot-button, almost a grenade with respect to the 90-day negotiations.”

China has a long history of reading darker motives into US actions. “The risk is conspiracy theories in Beijing,” said China scholar Michael Pillsbury at Hudson Institute, who consults regularly with the Trump trade team. He compares the events to when China rejected US explanations that the United States had made a mistake when it bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo war.

The arrest indicated the Justice Department had significant evidence against Meng, and that additional charges were likely, said Brian Fleming, a trade and national security lawyer at Miller & Chevalier. “This is just the tip of the iceberg,” he said.

The arrest could also add ammunition to an extraordinary US government campaign to persuade wireless and Internet providers in allied countries to stop using telecommunications equipment from Huawei, said national security experts. US officials say they are intensifying efforts to curb Huawei because wireless carriers world-wide are about to upgrade to 5G, a new wireless technology that will connect many more items—factory parts, self-driving cars and everyday objects like wearable health monitors – to the Internet. US officials say they don’t want to give Beijing the potential to interfere with an ever-growing universe of connected devices.

By Kate O’keeffe and Bob Davis


Huawei reveals the real trade war with China


Tech rivalry: The high-tech trade war shows that for all the hoopla over manufacturing jobs, steel autos and tariffs, the real competition is in the tech sector. — Reuters  
Why China's Huawei Matters http://www.wsj.com/video/why-china-huawei-matters/C3AC2323-4E49-4176-AD53-7BC76B9635DD.html

https://youtu.be/tpEXcW31awQ

IF you only scan the headlines, you could be forgiven for thinking that the US-China trade war is mainly about tariffs.

After all, the president and trade-warrior-in-chief has called himself “Tariff Man”. And the tentative trade deal between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping was mainly about tariffs, especially on items like automobiles.

But the startling arrest in Canada of a Chinese telecom company executive should wake people up to the fact that there’s a second US-China trade war going on – a much more stealthy conflict, fought with weapons much subtler and more devastating than tariffs. And the prize in that other struggle is domination of the information-technology industry.

The arrested executive, Wanzhou Meng, is the chief financial officer of telecom-equipment manufacturer Huawei Technologies Co (and its founder’s daughter). The official reason for her arrest is that Huawei is suspected of selling technology to Iran, in violation of US sanctions.

It’s the second big Chinese tech company to be accused of breaching those sanctions – the first was ZTE Corp in 2017. The United States punished ZTE by forbidding it from buying American components – most importantly, telecom chips made by US-based Qualcomm Inc. Those purchasing restrictions were eventually lifted after ZTE agreed to pay a fine, and it seems certain that Huawei will also eventually escape severe punishment. But these episodes highlight Chinese companies’ dependence on critical US technology.

The United States. still makes – or at least, designs – the best computer chips in the world. China assembles lots of electronics, but without those crucial inputs of US technology, products made by companies such as Huawei would be of much lower quality.

Export restrictions, and threats of restrictions, are thus probably not just about sanctions – they’re about making life harder for the main competitors of US tech companies.

Huawei just passed Apple Inc to become the world’s second-largest smartphone maker by market share (Samsung Electronics Co is first). This marks a change for China, whose companies have long been stuck doing low-value assembly while companies in rich countries do the high-value design, marketing and component manufacturing.

US moves against Huawei and ZTE may be intended to force China to remain a cheap supplier instead of a threatening competitor.

The subtle, far-sighted nature of this approach suggests that the impetus for the high-tech trade war goes far beyond what Trump, with his focus on tariffs and old-line manufacturing industries, would think of. It seems likely that US tech companies, as well as the military intelligence communities, are influencing policy here as well.

In fact, more systematic efforts to block Chinese access to US components are in the works. The Export Control Reform Act, passed this summer, increased regulatory oversight of US exports of “emerging” and “foundational” technologies deemed to have national-security importance. Although national security is certainly a concern, it’s generally hard to separate high-tech industrial and corporate dominance from military dominance, so this too should be seen as part of the trade war.

A second weapon in the high-tech trade war is investment restrictions. The Trump administration has greatly expanded its power to block Chinese investments in US technology companies, through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

The goal of investment restrictions is to prevent Chinese companies from copying or stealing American ideas and technologies. Chinese companies can buy American companies and transfer their intellectual property overseas, or have their employees train their Chinese replacements.

Even minority stakes can allow a Chinese investor access to industrial secrets that would otherwise be off-limits. By blocking these investors, the Trump administration hopes to preserve US technological dominance, at least for a little while longer.

Notably, the European Union is also moving to restrict Chinese investments. The fact that Europe, which has opposed Trump’s tariffs, is copying American investment restrictions, should be a signal that the less-publicised high-tech trade war is actually the important one. The high-tech trade war shows that for all the hoopla over manufacturing jobs, steel, autos and tariffs, the real competition is in the tech sector.

Losing the lead in the global technology race means lower profits and a disappearing military advantage. But it also means losing the powerful knowledge-industry clustering effects that have been an engine of US economic growth in the post-manufacturing age. Bluntly put, the United States can afford to lose its lead in furniture manufacturing; it can’t afford to lose its dominance in the tech sector.

The question is whether the high-tech trade war will succeed in keeping China in second place. China has long wanted to catch up in semiconductor manufacturing, but export controls will make that goal a necessity rather than an aspiration. And investment restrictions may spur China to upgrade its own homegrown research and development capacity.

In other words, in the age when China and the United States were economically co-dependent, China might have been content to accept lower profit margins and keep copying American technology instead of developing its own. But with the coming of the high-tech trade war, that co-dependency is coming to an end. Perhaps that was always inevitable, as China pressed forward on the technological frontier. In any case, the Trump administration’s recent moves against Chinese tech – and some similar moves by the EU – should be seen as the first shots in a long war.

 — Bloomberg by Noah Smit


Related:

Huawei to sell servers with own chips in cloud computing push

Huawei to sell servers with own chips in cloud computing push

Tuesday, April 18, 2017

Xi's governance of China book a hot seller


After its debut in Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China has become a top seller and been well-received among local officials and scholars, with many hailing the value of the book for both its language and its outreach.

The book, which outlines the political ideas of the top leadership in China, has been released in Thai, Khmer and Urdu versions in the respective capitals of the three countries in the past two weeks.

A Thai publisher sold more than 2,000 copies of the book in a single day after its launch in Bangkok on April 7, with many readers inquiring on social media about ways to purchase the book, reported Xinhua news agency.

Thai Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam, who had read the book, said it was written in beautiful language, even though it was not in the form of a novel or essays.

“I believe that to be a great leader, one has to be a good reader, good thinker, good speaker, good writer and good doer, and I found President Xi has achieved all of them after I finished reading this book,” he said.

In Phnom Penh, more than 700 officials, scholars and entrepreneurs, including Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen and five deputy prime ministers, attended the launching ceremony for the book on April 11.

Chea Munyrith, director of the Confucius Institute of the Royal Academy of Cambodia, said publishing a Khmer version will enable the Cambodian people to better learn about China and Xi himself.

Chea, who assisted in the translation of the book into Khmer, said it offers insights for government officials and scholars on how to properly manage a country.

“That is why it is important for the officials, students and scholars in Cambodia to read through the book,” he said.

At the launching ceremony of the Urdu edition of the book in Islamabad on Friday, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said the book is as much about the contemporary world as it is about China.

“What has touched me most is that this book is not just about high-level politics, but also about moving stories of common people, their lives and inspirations about hard work and family values,” he said.

“This book is as much about the “Chinese Dream” as it is about the global dream to have a peaceful, harmonious and connected world,” he added.

Building a community of shared destiny is an important concept embodied in Xi’s thoughts on governance of the nation, said Jiang Jianguo, deputy head of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and minister of the State Council Information Office.

“And this concept has been included in the resolutions passed by United Nations organisations,” Jiang said in Islamabad.

Source: China Daily/Asia News Network

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Thursday, February 7, 2013

Would the 3 Japanese wise men invited by China help ties with Japan?

SINCE last month, tensions over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, known as Diaoyu to China and Senkaku to Japan, have noticeably declined, largely as a result of conciliatory words and actions by Japanese political figures visiting China.

The first was by Yukio Hatoyama of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, who was prime minister in 2009-2010 and who had advocated closer ties with China while in office. Hatoyama took issue with Japan's position of denying that there was a territorial dispute, saying "if you look at history, there is a dispute".

The former leader also visited a memorial in Nanjing honouring those who were killed in 1937 and apologised for "the crimes that Japanese soldiers committed during wartime".

Hatoyama's visit was widely publicised in the Chinese media, which published pictures of him and his wife at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial bowing in silent tribute to the dead.

The normally nationalistic Chinese newspaper Global Times declared editorially: "Hatoyama's words and deeds these days show that in spite of the tough environment, forces which are friendly to China have not disappeared."

Shortly after Hatoyama's departure from China, Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the New Komeito Party -- a coalition partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party -- arrived in China, carrying with him a letter from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for Xi Jinping, the new leader of the Communist Party of China.

Yamaguchi was received by Xi on Jan 25, and, aside from passing over the letter from the prime minister, he also suggested that the territorial dispute be shelved for now and to let future generations deal with the issue.

Xi no doubt knew that the Japanese politician was paraphrasing the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who, while visiting Tokyo in 1978, famously said, "Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all."

Alas, no solution is yet in sight and the best policy is to put the dispute back on the shelf.

Yamaguchi also suggested a summit meeting between Abe and Xi, and the Chinese leader responded that he would consider it seriously if there was a "proper environment".

Xi also said that China wanted to promote a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" with Japan.

Soon, a third influential Japanese political figure arrived, another former prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, whose visit, like the other two, contributed to the establishment of an improved environment.

It was Murayama who, while in power, issued an apology on historical issues that was widely hailed in Asia.

The visits by these three Japanese figures have contributed to a lowering of tensions, making it possible to envisage a thaw in China-Japan relations.

What is significant is that these three men were all invited by Beijing, which of course had a good idea of what they were likely to say and do. That is to say, without denigrating their contributions to the lessening of the impasse, the improved atmosphere of the last few weeks was largely the result of initiatives taken by China.

Japan, too, clearly wants to keep tensions low. Abe has now made it clear that he endorses the Murayama's statement, although there is still some talk of making a new statement "suitable to the 21st century". But there is unlikely to be any backtracking.

It is imperative at this stage that both Japan and China recognise the delicate political environment in the other's country. Each should rein in its own aggressive nationalistic forces.

It is also necessary for each side not to say or do anything that may be humiliating or embarrassing to the other side. Threatening to fire "warning shots", for example, is not helpful.

A lot of damage has been done to China-Japan relations. It will take time for the relationship to heal.

When Abe became prime minister for the first time in 2006, he went to China on his first overseas visit to mend relations damaged during the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi, who insisted on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine each year.

This led to a dramatic improvement in relations, with Premier Wen Jiabao making an "ice-melting" visit to Japan in 2007, followed by a presidential visit by Hu Jintao the following year.

Another China-Japan summit will be indispensable if ties are to be rebuilt.

This, however, cannot take place until the necessary groundwork has been laid. Both sides will have to work hard at this. And flexibility should be the watchword.

The row over the disputed islets, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, are seen in this file handout photograph taken on a marine surveillance plane B-3837 on December 13, 2012, and provided by the State Oceanic Administration of People's Republic of China. A long-simmering row over the East China Sea islands, has noticeably declined, largely as a result of conciliatory words and actions by Japanese political figures visiting China. Reuters pic 

By Frank Ching New Straits Times

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Tuesday, May 29, 2012

China's Revolutionary New Thinking On Private Capital

In a stunning series of announcements last week, Beijing opened the doors to private capital.  In the process, officials signaled a reversal of a half decade of anti-reform sentiment.

Play Video China has issued new measures on guiding non-governmental capital into the domestic banking sector.

The China Banking Regulatory Commission has stated that private investors will have equal rights with other state-owned banks. Private investors can bid for the establishment and capital increase of a rural bank.



They can now have a larger share of a rural bank, as state-owned financial institutions shareholding has been lowered to 15% from 20%.

In addition, the Chinese banking industry will strengthen its financial support for private investors.

Yesterday, for instance, the China Banking Regulatory Commission announced private capital will have the same entry standards as state capital when it comes to the country’s banks.  Specifically, private companies will be able to buy into banks through private stock placements, new share subscriptions, equity transfers, and mergers and acquisitions.  Moreover, the government will liberalize investment into the rural banks and as well as the trust, financial leasing, and auto financing sectors.

And on the day before, Beijing gave the “all-clear” for the break up of state monopolies.  The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission issued guidelines that, among other things, permit private investors to contribute cash or assets like intellectual property to state enterprises in return for equity and discourage these enterprises from placing additional restrictions on private parties when the enterprises sell their stakes in listed companies.  As SASAC noted, “The guideline reflects equal treatment of various kinds of investors and it helps ensure fairness in economic development.”

These two major developments followed a series of other recent indications of liberalization.  The China Securities Regulatory Commission announced it would allow private companies to list on domestic and foreign stock markets and to issue bonds; the National Development and Reform Commission said it is drafting rules to open the electricity, oil, and natural gas sectors to private capital; and the Ministry of Railways talked about opening railroads to private capital.  The State Council itself announced it is looking for private investment in the energy, telecom, education, and health care industries.

China, in short, is open for business, and there is no mystery surrounding the sudden change of attitude.  First, many cite the eroding profitability of state enterprises for these announcements.  In fact, official figures show that their profits fell 8.6% year-on-year in the January-April 2012 period.

Second, other factors include the decline of foreign direct investment—FDI fell for the sixth consecutive month in April—and a dramatic slowdown in economic activity—the economy showed signs of either zero growth or contraction last month.  Initial indications for this month, such as the sinking HSBC Flash PMI, are mostly bearish.

Third, Beijing technocrats realize they will fall far short of reaching their target of 36 trillion yuan of fixed asset investment because the central government can only “channel” 402 billion yuan and state enterprises are sitting on their hands.  The inescapable conclusion is that the only way to make up the difference is private capital.

Despite the country’s economic distress, it’s not clear when we will actually see implementation of the dramatic announcements.  For one thing, it is not an encouraging sign that Beijing issued precious few details.  At the moment, this looks like another instance of Chinese vaporware.

Why?  In the last few years state enterprises have become entrenched and extremely powerful in Chinese political circles.  And provincial and local governments are even more hostile to non-state capital because of the perceived divergence of interests between private investors and Party officials.

Moreover, it’s unlikely that much, if anything, will get done this year as top leaders are now embroiled in disruptive political struggles.  In fact, part of the reason for the accelerating economic slide is that for months they have been distracted by the worsening turmoil in the top reaches of the Party.  Moreover, not much may get done next year either.  Xi Jinping is slated to take over this fall, and new supremos usually take a couple years before they are able to effectively exercise power.

In any event, central government ministries, if they were truly serious about liberalization, would just implement structural changes as opposed to talking about them.  Until there is a sign he is serious this time, many will think Premier Wen Jiabao is borrowing from his 2010 playbook when he had his State Council grandly announced similar reforms that were not put into effect with real rules.

And there is one more factor suggesting private capital will not rescue the Chinese economy this time.  As domestic and foreign investors learn more about both the fundamental and cyclical problems in China, it will be increasingly unlikely that anyone will commit substantial sums to the country.

After all, you don’t see private investors heading for Greece at the moment, and in some important ways China is in far worse shape.  The internal and global narratives on the Chinese economy and political system are changing, and those changes are bound to have a negative effect on investment sentiment.

In short, Beijing’s announcements this month may evidence a welcome change of heart, but they could end up being both too little and too late to stop the country’s accelerating slide.

Gordon G. Chang
Gordon G. Chang, Forbes Contributor

I write primarily on China, Asia, and nuclear proliferation.

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Tuesday, March 6, 2012

Wife of China next president Xi Jinping

China's Singing Future First Lady



BEIJING, (AFP) - For the first time since Mao, China's next leader will have a wife who is famous in her own right: Xi Jinping will ascend to power with hugely popular singer Peng Liyuan at his side.

The soprano, who holds the rank of general in the army, is renowned from Shanghai to Urumqi and starred for 25 years in CCTV state television's Lunar New Year gala, a broadcast watched by hundreds of millions of viewers.

Her husband is widely expected to become China's president next year and will be under the spotlight at the annual set-piece session of the country's parliament, which opened Monday.

Since the fall of Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's last wife and the widely-loathed leading member of the Gang of Four blamed for the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders' spouses have been expected to stay in the shadows.

''After the Mao era, the wives of senior Chinese leaders stopped appearing in public,'' said Zhang Yaojie, a researcher at the National Academy of Arts.

But Peng will be a deeply atypical first lady. In videos seen on the Internet, the 49-year-old seizes the limelight with her high cheekbones, thick jet-black hair, and radiant smile.

Her costumes range from military uniform to richly embroidered ethnic dress, and her repertoire includes syrupy melodies and folk songs whose lyrics have been altered to glorify the Communist Party.

Apparently in perfect harmony with her husband, a Party ''princeling'' with strong military links, her ver-sion of one traditional Tibetan tune describes the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as ''the saving star of the Communist Party''.

Peng, who comes from an area in the eastern province of Shandong known for its peonies and was nicknamed the ''Peony Fairy'' by her admirers, joined the army at the age of 18.

A semi-official biography posted on Chinese web portals tells how she began as an ordinary soldier, but began performing at PLA shows to boost troop morale.

In the 1980s she was one of the first people to take a master of arts in folk music in China. Her professor has spoken of her dedication to her studies.

Peng has performed in 50 countries and won many awards, but it was the Lunar New Year gala that propelled her to stardom.

When she finally retired from the television show in 2008, some speculated that it was to avoid overshadow-ing her husband, who was then far less well-known than her but had just joined the Politburo Standing Committee, the party's highest-ranking body.

''As an artist, she may suffer, in the way that Carla Bruni has a bit,'' said Michel Bonnin, director of the Franco-Chinese Centre at Tsinghua University, referring to the former model and singer who married French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

But Peng can help Xi ''to have a less dull image than Chinese politicians usually do,'' Bonnin added.

In interviews with Chinese media, Peng heaps praise on the ''ideal husband'' she married 25 years ago, and with whom she has a daughter, now a student at Harvard.

''He is simple and honest, but very thoughtful,'' Peng told the China News Weekly, adding that he has told her: ''In less than 40 minutes after I met you, I knew you would be my wife.''

But Peng's parents were not keen to see their daughter marry such a senior figure, fearing she would not be treated well because of her humble origins.

''He treats me like a little sister. Jinping is always busy. He is concerned about thousands of households, without thinking of himself,'' she said on the government site China.org.cn.

''When he is at home, I cook the dishes he likes to help him relax.''

Peng has been keen to convey a homespun image, telling the People's Daily's Huanqiu Renwu magazine she has simple tastes, enjoying ''going to the market by bicycle and bargaining with vendors''.

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Friday, February 24, 2012

Singapore ‘warns’ US on China bashing

Realism as S’pore ‘warns’ US

Behind The Headlines By Bunn Nagara

The city state has begun to adjust to emerging regional realities while pivoting on its pragmatic impulses, as always, while steering a steady course between China and the US.

SINGAPORE’S political positions are nothing if not coolly calculated and calibrated. They are specially so when expressed in formal statements at high-level meetings.

In Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam’s keynote address to the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) gathering in Washington recently, US media reported him as “warning” the US against China-bashing rhetoric.



Words about containing China, particularly in the populist mood of a US election year, would he said cause a “new and intended reality for the region.” It was not the first time Shanmugam had said so, having previously cautioned against the futility of containing a rising China.

However, these statements do mark a shift from previous Singapore policies on the US and China. As a small country overwhelmingly dependent on international trade, finance and therefore regional stability, an unwritten rule for Singapore has long been to avoid making waves while sidling up to the largest kid on the block.

Neither the region’s pecking order nor Singapore’s guiding principles have changed, only the emerging realities on the ground. The wherewithal for continued US pre-eminence has largely flattened out without having yet declined, while China’s stature and substance continue to rise.

The Obama administration has lately pledged to boost the US regional presence, but the extent, duration and consistency of doing so are unclear. China, meanwhile, has no need to risk overstretching itself in East Asia because it is in the region’s centre.

At one level, Singapore’s latest statement confirms a shift from former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s pro-US slant following his retirement last May. For half a century, Lee had championed an alliance with the US over other powers like China, lately much of it because of a rising China.

At a more substantive level, Shanmugam’s statement well indicates Singapore’s new and belated efforts to woo an ascendant China. In seeming different now, Singapore is merely reaffirming its standard pragmatism based on an acute sense of self-preservation.

For the region, Singapore’s new tack may be surprising at first but not unwelcome. It simply expressed the obvious when that needed expressing, even if in doing so it made Singapore look more pro-active than its neighbours in acknowledging China’s burgeoning gravitas.

Singapore’s advice to Washington also came on the eve of Chinese vice-president (and prospective president) Xi Jinping’s state visit. The timing had apparently turned up the volume of Shanmugam’s statement to US lawmakers and their constituents.

Like everyone else, the US had long perceived Singapore as a feisty independent state averse to China’s dominance, following its early struggle against ethnic Chinese leftists and then its break-up with Malaysia, while retaining a largely ethnic Chinese population.

Today, Singapore’s “new look” policy is effectively not only for Washington’s benefit or just to showcase a contemporary Singapore to China. It also serves as an oblique reminder to Beijing that any hostile US rhetoric now would be mere campaign posturing and therefore undeserving of a like reaction.

After all, China is also getting set for a leadership change, a time when new directions may be set in ways likely to appease the populace. Its decade-long leadership is more than twice as enduring as a US presidential term and its policy direction could be several times as significant as the US equivalent.

Still, news reports implying how tiny Singapore had “warned” the world’s sole superpower might have seemed strong, if not strange. It is a measure of Singapore’s new posture that far from denying such reports, Shanmugam proceeded to expand on his comments.

He noted with approval how Chinese media widely reported his comments approvingly. Singapore media were also not shy in lingering over the issue.

The Straits Times noted that “a power transition is under way” in the region. Singapore-based Channel News Asia noted how well Shanmugam’s remarks had played in China.

Nonetheless, many US Netizens were not as hospitable to the comments. Among the more common responses was the defensive argument that US rhetoric against China was free speech and so warranted no warning or censure.

Another common reaction was to despise China and its unfolding development even more. A zero-sum mentality prevailed on US-China relations, aggravated by a pervasive sense of a declining US economy in free fall.

The third common reaction among Americans commenting online was to attack the messenger. Thus Shanmugam was criticised for acknowledging China’s success and daring to warn the US over it.

Singapore’s revised articulation of regional realities does not surprise any serious onlooker in Asia. Its concerns are self-evident, its priorities apparent, and its assessment of the region timely.

A contrast comes with the Philippines, where rival claims with China over offshore territory has come to define their relationship. This amounts to allowing marginal interests to determine larger substantive ones: yet again, pragmatism distinguishes Singapore’s policies from the Philippines’.

Even so, Singapore’s recent assessment of regional realities sums up Asean’s understanding of them. What Washington will make of it, if anything, is anybody’s guess.

Republicans are particularly anxious to parade their conservative values, such as by defending US prerogatives, paramountcy and exceptionalism. This has encouraged emotive responses from Americans “in America’s interest.”

Democrats can only respond defensively by trying to match or pre-empt the Republicans’ US-centric aggressiveness. However much the Obama White House may prefer a more mature and measured response, it must also know that is far less likely to “sell”.

Thus Shanmugam’s counsel to Washington comes full circle. He spoke as he did because of the circumstances of the time, and it is those circumstances that now make him an easy target in the US.

As Americans brace for a presidential election in November, all parties can be just as prickly over any foreign reminders that the US needs to behave better. And it is practically a given that enraged US Netizens disconnected from reality will be given a better hearing in Washington than even the most thoughtful of allies in Asia.

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Singapore warns US on anti-China rhetoric!
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Monday, February 20, 2012

China's next president: Xi Jinping, a 'princeling' with a big personality

Vice President Xi Jinping
Vice President Xi Jinping 
Xi Jinping: a 'princeling' with a big personality

China's heir apparent is affable and more open to economic reforms, but his intentions remain an enigma

By Tania Branigan in Beijing guardian.co.uk


 
Chinese vice-president Xi Jinping, tipped as a future leader, arrives in the US to meet officials in Washington Link to this video
 
His name is becoming more familiar but his face is still unknown to most and his opinions and intentions are an enigma.

Xi Jinping's visit to the US this week is unlikely to answer the west's most important questions.

But this is a getting-to-know-you trip for China's heir apparent, who is expected to take the helm of the world's second largest economy and fastest rising power from late this year.

The Chinese vice-president's Valentine's Day meeting with Barack Obama is notable – as are his plans to catch a Los Angeles Lakers basketball game and to return to Muscatine, the tiny Iowa town he visited in 1985 as head of an animal feed delegation.

His activities suggest he is shaping an image very different from that of the current Chinese president, Hu Jintao.

While Hu is determinedly anonymous, Xi is "a big personality", according to those who have met him.

Standing over 6ft tall, he is confident and affable. He boasts a ready smile and a glamorous second wife – the renowned People's Liberation Army singer Peng Liyuan. He has expressed his fondness for US war movies and, perhaps more surprisingly, praised the edgy independent film-maker Jia Zhangke.

This is, in part, a generational and social shift. Xi is 58 and, like the other rising stars in Chinese politics, grew up in the era of reform and opening.



While Hu's first visit to the US was in 2002, Xi and his peers have travelled frequently and several have personal links with the west. Xi's daughter is studying at Harvard and a sister is thought to live in Canada. And like many of his peers, he is a "princeling" – someone who has experienced both privilege and prejudice as the child of a powerful Communist party figure.

Xi was born in 1953 to Xi Zhongxun, a Long March hero who later became a vice-premier, and Qi Xin. He grew up in the relative comfort of Zhongnanhai, the party elite's red-walled Beijing compound.

Loneliness

But when he was only nine his father fell from grace with Mao Zedong. Six years later, as the cultural revolution wreaked havoc, young Xi was dispatched to the dusty, impoverished north-western province of Shaanxi to "learn from the masses".

He spent seven years living in a cave home in Liangjiahe village. "I ate a lot more bitterness than most people," he once told a Chinese magazine. He has described struggling with the fleas, the hard physical labour and the sheer loneliness.

All this, of course, fits into classic Communist party narratives of learning to serve the people. But political commentator Li Datong suggests this "double background" has proved genuinely formative for princelings such as Xi and might even lead them to bolder policy making.

"One aspect is their family background as children of the country's founders and the other is their experience of being sent to the countryside, which made them understand China's real situation better. It gives this generation a strong tradition of idealism and the courage to do something big," he said.

Although he has openly criticised the cultural revolution, Xi embraced the party; in a WikiLeaks cable an academic who knew Xi as a young man suggested he "chose to survive by becoming redder than red".

Family links helped him to win a place studying chemical engineering at the elite Tsinghua University, followed by a post as aide to a powerful military leader, Geng Biao – the beginning of his useful People's Liberation Army (PLA) connections.

Next came a more surprising move – his choice, says political expert Zhang Xiaojin – to an unglamorous post in Hebei province. He may have hoped to shake off suggestions of benefiting from his family name.

It was as deputy secretary of Zhengding county that he visited Muscatine, a US town of 23,000 until now best known for its melons and Mark Twain's brief sojourn there in 1855.

"He was a very polite and kind guy. I could see someone very devoted to his work – there was no golfing on that trip, that's for sure," said Eleanor Dvorchak, who hosted Xi in her son's old room, where he slept amid football wallpaper and Star Trek figurines. "He was serious. He was a man on a mission."

Sarah Lande, who organised the trip, said his confidence was obvious even through a translator.

"You could tell he was in charge … he seemed relaxed and welcoming and able to handle things," she said. "He had the words he wanted to express himself easily."

The acquaintance who spoke to WikiLeaks claimed Xi always had his "eye on the prize" of a major party post. He transferred to southern Fujian province in 1985, climbing steadily upwards over 17 years. Most of his experience has been earned in China's relatively prosperous, entrepreneurial coastal areas, where he courted investors and built up business, proving willing to adopt new ideas. The former US treasury secretary Hank Paulson called him "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line".

After the toppling of Shanghai's party secretary Chen Liangyu in a corruption scandal, Xi took charge of the city in 2007. Barely six months later his elevation to the politburo standing committee – the top political body – signalled that he was expected to succeed Hu. In October 2010 his appointment as vice-chair of the central military commission cemented his position.

He describes his own thinking as pragmatic and throughout his rise he has cultivated a down-to-earth image; in the provinces he ate in government canteens and often dressed down.

In a burst of publicity shortly before his 2007 promotion his wife lauded his humble nature and devotion to duty, revealing that on their second date he warned her he would not have much time for family life. And in a system known for corruption, he also has a clean reputation. One friend told the LA Times the worst the paper was likely to find were overdue library books.

But while Xi is well-liked and adept at glad-handing, he appears to give little of importance away. Even his popular wife has retreated into the background as he has assumed increasing prominence.

The US ambassador Gary Locke recently observed that he was "very personable" but that US officials "really don't know that much about him".

Close association with particular policies or factions has its dangers. Becoming general secretary of the party, and thus leader of China, is "an issue of who opposes you rather than who supports you", said Kerry Brown, head of the Asia programme at Chatham House.

Beyond his openness to economic reforms, Xi is known primarily as a figure who appeals to different groupings and as a safe pair of hands.

"In recent years he has taken care of large-scale events, including Olympics and anniversaries, and there haven't been any big mistakes. Xi has steadily been through these tests," said Zhang.

In 2007 he leapfrogged Li Keqiang – until then seen as likely to succeed Hu, but seen perhaps as too much Hu's protege – as the consensus candidate in a system built on collective decision making.

Xi's networks are unusually broad, according to Brown: "Provincially; through his family; and with the military through Geng Biao. His elevation is in the interests of the widest group of people and opposed by the smallest group." It is the same relatively small elite who will determine what he can do with the job.

Liberal

Some hope he shares his father's liberal sympathies: Xi senior was not only a noted economic reformer, but an ally of reformist leader Hu Yaobang. Some say he criticised the military crackdown on Tiananmen Square's pro-democracy protests in 1989.

They say that grassroots organisations burgeoned during the vice-president's stint in Zhejiang, and there was progress in the election of independent candidates at local polls. But the Chinese Human Rights Defenders network has argued the province also saw "zealous persecution" of dissidents, underground Christians and activists: "His track record does not bode well," it wrote. Other China watchers point to shattered hopes that Hu might prove politically liberal.

Nor does Xi's confidence in overseas dealings necessarily indicate a more emollient approach to foreign relations. His most-quoted remark to date was made on a trip to Mexico in 2009: "There are some well-fed foreigners who have nothing better to do than point fingers at our affairs. China does not, first, export revolution; second, export poverty and hunger; third, cause troubles for you. What else is there to say?"

In any case, to read Xi as a man in sole control of the agenda is to fundamentally misunderstand the Chinese political system. He will be "first among equals" in the nine-member standing committee, say analysts. Hu and other former leaders will still exert influence; and 2011's five-year plan has plotted the immediate course.

The system "is in favour of moderation, and nothing can change quickly. Steady as it goes. The political rhythm first has to be installed … significant shifts will come later," said Dr David Kelly, director of the Beijing-based political thinktank China Policy.

Some think Xi's networks may allow him to strike out more confidently than Hu. Others think he will struggle to win support for bold decisions needed to tackle the country's mounting challenges. "I think he's a more instinctive and gut-driven politician and may surprise us. Others say the system and the vested interests around him are too strong," said Brown.

His leadership will be shaped by his colleagues and framed by external forces. "What's very important is the capacity to be on the right side of history," said Cheng Li, an analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "He himself probably does not know what he will do."

Pocket profile

Born June 1953

Career His father was a revolutionary hero and a steady rise through party ranks, aided by expert networking, is set to take Xi to the very top. His family background has dogged him at times but also speeded him on his course.

High point Emerging as heir apparent to Hu Jintao at the 17th party congress in 2007. Many had expected Li Keqiang – now expected to become premier – to take the position.

Low point Coming last in the vote for membership of the central committee in 1997, amid hostility to princelings. Connections won him a place as an alternate.

What he says "Are you trying to give me a fright?" (when asked by a reporter, in 2002, whether he would be a top leader within the decade).

What they say "He's more assertive than Hu Jintao. When he enters the room, you know there is a significant presence here … [But] when they rise through their hierarchy, it serves no purpose to indicate differences or even alternative directions." (Henry Kissinger)

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